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Abstract: 
Many economists think that the agency cost theory and the residual theory are 
the most appropriate explanations of the dividend policies in large corporations. The 
signaling theory, on the other hand, seems no longer to be relevant nowadays. This 
thesis is an empirical one and it incorporates a four-hypothesis model to investigate 
which of the four hypotheses: the anti-signaling hypothesis, the agency cost 
hypothesis, the residual hypothesis and the investment opportunities hypothesis are 
consistent with the current dividend policy of Hong Kong corporations. The primary 
proxy for the four hypotheses are respectively total income growth rate, family 
shareholders concentration rate, free cash flow growth rate and fixed assets growth 
rate. Substantial shareholder concentration rate is also used as a secondary proxy for 
the agency cost hypothesis. Besides, whether companies in technology industry do 
pay a significantly lower dividend is also examined. The OLS linear regression 
results on a cross section of 76 Hong Kong listed companies support the anti-
signaling, residual, investment opportunities hypotheses and the technology industry 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
Dividend policy has been generally referred to as the corporate decision of 
whether to pay out some share of profits to the shareholders and, if so, when to pay 
it, pay in what form, and how much to pay. Nowadays, there are few easy answers to 
these real and pressing questions, since there are now many more considerations 
involved in making dividend decisions. 
Issues concerning the question of when to pay typically refer to the frequency 
of dividend payment - whether annual, semiannual or quarterly. Most firms in Hong 
Kong pay regular cash dividends on a semiannual basis. Some firms however do 
distribute an additional dividend, called a special dividend to signify that it is an 
extraordinary one-time payment. Beyond the issue of payment frequency, the 
mechanical aspects of the dividend payout process actually involve four dates: the 
declaration date, the holder record date, the ex-dividend date and the payment date. 
The declaration date is the date on which the board of directors meets and 
declares the terms and timing of dividend payments. The holder record date is the 
date on which the firm compiles a list of all current shareholders entitled to 
dividends. The ex-dividend date is the final stock trading date for entitlement to the 
dividend, which is four business days before the holder record date. Last, the 
payment date is the date on which the firm mails the dividend by cheque to the 
stockholders listed on the holder record date. 
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Regarding the question of what to pay, this decision has become more 
complex in recent years since there are various means of distributing company 
wealth to investors. On the whole, there are four types of dividend: cash dividend, 
stock dividend, stock split, and stock repurchase. 
A cash dividend is a cash payment to the corporate shareholders. When a 
company distributes a cash dividend, it reduces the liquid assets and retains fewer 
resources for investment. 
A stock dividend is a payment of additional stock shares to the company's 
shareholders on a pro rata basis. It does not decrease the company's liquid assets. It 
is simply a bookkeeping transfer from the company's retained earnings to the capital 
stock or the paid-in capital account. There is no shrink in stockholders' equity or 
assets. For instance, a 5 percent stock dividend means that the stockholders receive 
an extra 5 shares for every 100 shares but make no additional payment. 
A stock split is similar to a stock dividend but requires different bookkeeping. 
It is merely like dividing a pie into smaller slices as split reduces the price per share 
in proportion to the increase in shares. To cite an example, in a two for one (2:1) 
split, two new shares replace each stockholder's share such that the number of shares 
outstanding is doubled, but each share's value is normally cut by half. It is 
commonly believed that companies split their stocks only if the price is quite high 
and the management thinks that the future is bright. Consequently, a stock split is 
often taken as a positive signal and it boosts the stock price. 
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A stock repurchase involves using the accumulated cash to buy back a 
percentage of company's outstanding shares. In this way, the number of shares will 
decrease, which may enhance both the earnings per shares and the stock prices. 
Repurchases are useftil for making major changes in capital structure, as well as for 
distributing temporary excess cash. 
Among the four types of dividends, cash dividend is the most familiar type of 
dividend adopted by companies in Hong Kong. Cash payout is also the most 
common type which has been generally studied in the literature. However, in this 
thesis, how firms determine which types of dividend to pay will not be discussed 
further. Instead, the focus is on answering the question of how much to pay. More 
specifically, this thesis aims at analyzing why some firms are paying more cash 
dividends while some firms are paying less. 
Undoubtedly, a number of factors influence the corporate choice of dividend 
policy, such as tax, transaction cost, legal constraint, investment opportunities, 
availability of other fund sources, preference of shareholders, asymmetric 
information, principal-agency problem and the amount of free cash flow. Dividends 
paid by companies in Hong Kong are not subject to tax. So most probably, tax should 
not be one of the factors affecting dividend policy in Hong Kong. But then which of 
the others affect Hong Kong companies' dividend decisions the most? 
Plenty of theoretical and empirical research on dividend policy has been done 
since the 1950s. With the exception of those earliest works which examined whether 
the dividend policy was relevant or not, almost all the rest of them tried to determine 
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which of the factors posed above exert a significant impact on dividend policies. For 
instance, as investors are facing the problem of asymmetric information, some 
researchers investigate how dividend plays the role of conveying information about 
corporate prospects by looking at stock price movements after the announcement of a 
change in a dividend policy. Besides, some test whether dividend payout is an 
effective instrument to solve agency problem as paying out the remaining cash to 
outside shareholders can reduce the chance of improper use of money by insiders. 
In fact, within the literature from 1950s to 2000，six dividend policy theories 
have been generated and have become the major theories of this field. The six 
theories are: (1) dividend irrelevance theory, (2) bird-in-the-hand theory, (3) clientele 
effect theory, (4) signaling theory, (5) agency cost theory, and (6) residual theory. 
Current researches are mainly based on the latter three theories, and numerous 
evidences do show that the agency cost and residual theories are relevant to explain 
the present circumstance while the signaling theory is not. Does the same case 
pertain to the dividend policy issue in Hong Kong? 
Apart from the mentioned theories, the modern worldwide dividend policies 
have pronounced industry patterns. Those mature slow-growing industries with little 
investment opportunities, such as utility, petroleum, tobacco and banking, tend to pay 
higher dividends, whereas those younger, fast-growing technological industries with 
ample investment opportunities, such as semiconductors, computers and computer 
software, pay very low or even no dividends. How investment opportunities 
influence the dividend policy pattern in Hong Kong? Is there a significant technology 
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industry phenomenon that companies in this industry generally have lower dividend 
payout ratios? 
Inspired by the above theories and the industry pattern, a four-hypothesis 
model that control for the industry effects is built up. The four hypotheses are: (1) 
anti-signaling hypothesis, (2) agency cost hypothesis, (3) residual hypothesis, and (4) 
investment opportunities hypothesis. The anti-signaling hypothesis is a hypothesis 
which is opposite to the signaling theory. That means it wants to show that dividend 
cannot signal the firms' fiature earnings growth. 
The agency cost hypothesis uses the family shareholders shareholding as 
proxy for the outside shareholders protection. It predicts that the higher the family 
shareholders concentration, the higher the possibility of the firm suffers from agency 
problem since the family shareholders tend to collude and vote for issues which are 
against the interests of outside shareholders. In this way，the protection of the outside 
shareholders is lower and thus their dividends are lower. The substantial shareholders 
concentration proxy is substituted for the family shareholders concentration to test 
this hypothesis in the later subsection. 
For the residual and investment opportunities hypotheses, the former expects 
that the higher the free cash flow growth, the more the cash payout; the latter 
suggests that the greater the investment opportunities, the larger the dividend. 
Turning the attention to the empirical analysis, the cross-sectional regression 
results on 76 listed firms in Hong Kong support the anti-signaling, residual and 
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investment opportunities hypotheses. However, both family shareholders 
concentration and substantial shareholders concentration measurements fail to give 
significant results for the agency cost hypothesis. Within the seven industry control 
variables, technology industry is the only one which offers a strong evidence that it 
affects the dividend policy. 
This thesis proceeds as follows: Chapter 2 is a literature review which 
summarizes the six major dividend policy theories. Chapter 3 explains the four-
hypothesis model. Chapter 4 describes the sample and data. Chapter 5 presents the 
empirical findings and discusses the implications. Chapter 6 gives the conclusion. 
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Chapter 2 Literature Review 
Before looking deeper into the dividend policy literature, the first question we 
should ask is whether dividend policy is relevant. Actually, the relevance of dividend 
policy depends highly on its effect on the valuation of the company. If changes in 
dividend policy do not alter a company's value, the dividend policy is irrelevant. 
The classical theory developed by Miller and Modigliani in 1961 was such an 
irrelevance theory. Conversely, if its changes do affect a company's value, the 
dividend policy is relevant. The bird-in-the-hand theory and the clientele effect are 
two classical relevance theories. The signaling, agency cost and residuals theories are 
modern relevance theories. 
Besides, if there is a particular payout ratio which maximizes a company's value, 
then that ratio is the optimal dividend policy. Theoretically, the optimal dividend 
policy should exist (Levy, 1998). However, there are many variables which influence 
the policy in reality so that such optimal ratio is difficult to find. But the role of 
dividend in determining stock values still has been examined in those relevance 
theories. 
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2.1 Dividend Irrelevance Theory 
Merton Miller and Franco Modigliani (1961) are the major proponents who 
provide a formal argument of the dividend irrelevance theory. By assuming an ideal 
world with perfect capital market, rational behavior and perfect certainty, they 
conclude that dividend policy affects neither the stock price nor the total returns of 
the shareholders as long as the firm's investment policy is fixed. 
From the firms' perspective, they can retain their profits and fund the positive-
Net Present Value (NPV) investment opportunities by those retained earnings, or 
they can pay out those earnings as dividends and raise the required capital by issuing 
new shares. Since there are no taxes and transaction costs, both strategies generate 
the same total market value. 
Using a similar reasoning, investors are indifferent of obtaining their capital 
gains by allowing the firm to retain corporate earnings to finance those positive-NPV 
projects, or receiving dividends and permitting the firm to pay for its investment 
through selling new stocks. Without taxes and brokerage costs, their total returns are 
the same in either case. They can even create their homemade dividend policy. If a 
firm pays a lower dividend, investor can sell some shares and get the extra dividend 
if he wishes to hold more cash. On the contrary, if a firm pays a high dividend, 
investor can use the unwanted cash to buy additional shares. At the end, the 
combination of shares and cash in hand is the same. 
8 
2.2 Bird-in-the-hand Theory 
Another theory, which is opposite to Miller and Modigliani's irrelevance theory, 
has been proposed contemporaneously. Myron Gordon (1962) points out that 
dividend policy is relevant because investors expose to a higher risk of receiving 
future capital gains from reinvested retained earnings than receiving current 
dividends. So, they prefer current dividend payments to future capital gains. 
Nevertheless, Miller and Modigliani (1961) disagree and call Gordon's argument 
the bird-in-the-hand fallacy. They state that given the investment policy, a change in 
dividend policy affects neither the size of the expected total return during that period 
nor the degree of uncertainty about that total return. It merely implies a change in the 
distribution between dividends and capital gains. Therefore, so long as investors 
behave rationally, the firm's value cannot be affected. In fact, if investors do value 
stocks according to the Gordon approach and thus pay a premium for higher 
dividends, then, those low dividend stocks shareholders would actually realize 
consistently higher returns on their investments over any stated period. Finally, the 
size of their total returns would still be the same. 
Easterbrook (1984) also argues that there is no bird-in-the hand effect unless the 
firm reorganizes its investment policy. Otherwise, dividends are nothing to do with 
capital withdrawal from risky ventures since investors usually reinvest the proceeds 
in the same or similar firm rather than use them for consumption or to buy Treasury 
bills. As a result, they encounter the same risks just as though there had been no 
dividends. 
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2.3 Clientele Effect Theory 
Another classical relevance theory is the clientele effects. Pettit (1977) defines 
the dividend clientele effect as the preference of an individual investor holding 
portfolios with particular dividend paying characteristics due to market 
imperfections. Empirical evidence shows that the differential tax rate on dividends 
and capital gains, and time preference in the face of transactions costs are able to 
explain the variation in individual portfolio dividend yields i.e. there is a significant 
dividend clientele effect. Nonetheless, this study does not suggest that there is a 
relationship between firm's value and the dividend clientele effect. 
In fact, as what Miller and Modigliani (1961) have argued, one clientele is as 
good as another, thus none of a dividend policy is superior to the others. Besides, 
Easterbrook (1984) mentions that investors in different tax brackets have different 
preference for payout ratios. Since firms with different dividend policies cater 
different clienteles, some equilibrium would evolve ultimately. Hence, it does not 
matter whatever payout policy a firm adopts. 
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2.4 Signaling Theory 
About forty years ago, Miller and Modigliani (1958, 1961) hypothesized that the 
role of dividend policy is to signal management's view of corporation's future profit 
prospect. But no formal model has been developed in their papers. 
The first major dividend signaling paper was written by Bhattacharya (1979). 
Due to asymmetric information about firm's profitability, dividend policy has been 
used to signal the expected cash flow despite its tax disadvantage. He structures a 
model and derives that the shorter the length of investor's planning horizon, then the 
higher the urgency to realize wealth for consumption, and the higher the equilibrium 
payout level. Indeed, it is the bird-in-the-hand notion which advocates that dividends 
are better than capital gains for the reason that investors have to realize their wealth 
for consumption with respect to their planning horizons. 
The modern research on signaling are more empirical. However, there is limited 
evidence to support the claim that dividends convey information about future 
earnings growth. Harry DeAngelo, Linda DeAngelo and Douglas J. Skinner (1996) 
examine the abnormal future earnings, the short-term and long-term market 
responses of 245 firms in the New York Stock Exchange whose annual earnings 
declined after nine or more consecutive years of growth. Their findings suggest all 
but no indication that management's dividend decisions in the year of the earnings 
downturn (Year 0) are favorable signals of either the future earnings prospects or the 
differentiation of mediocre firms from the poor firms. 
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Their evidences offer three possible explanations: (1) managerial mistakes, (2) 
managerial overoptimistic and (3) modest cash commitment. Concerning the first 
factor, a small subset (12.1 percent) of dividend-increasing firms subsequently cut 
dividends, which implies the lack of information about future earnings when 
management raises dividends in Year 0. Conceptually, the second factor is distinct 
from the first one in the sense that the latter has sufficient and reasonable information 
prevailing at that time to infer that company prospects have faded. Yet，the managers 
are still unduly optimistic to overestimate future earnings and enlarge dividends. This 
point is also true by investigating the content of manager's letters to stockholders. 
For the last factor, the dollar increase is only 3.5 percent of earnings, 2.1 percent 
of operating cash flow, and 3.7 percent of cash plus marketable securities for the 
median dividend-increasing firm in Year 0. This reflects that mangers make only 
modest cash commitments when they boost dividends. Such a low cost payout would 
undermine the reliability of signals. 
Consistent with the above findings, another signaling paper written by Shlomo 
Benartzi, Roni Michaely and Richard Thaler (1997) also fails to provide any 
evidence to reveal that dividend announcements have information content on both 
the magnitude and the sign of the future earnings changes. Considering the 
magnitude, the size of the dividend increase does not predict the amount of future 
earnings. 
Looking at the sign, firstly, the dividend-increasing firms in year O have 1 
experienced positive significant earnings in years 一 1 and 0，but they show no 
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unexpected earnings growth in Years 1 and 2. For the dividend-decreasing firms, 
they do face reductions in earnings in years O and —1，but they continue to show 
significant increases in earnings in the two years after dividend cuts. Secondly, in 
spite of the similar earnings growth pattern, dividend-increasing firms are less likely 
than those non-changing firms to have subsequent drops in earnings. In this sense, 
the current increase in earnings is permanent. 
To summarize, all of the above lead to the view that dividends signal the past and 
current earnings instead of the future earnings. Hence, dividend is a lagging signal 
rather than a leading one. 
Nevertheless, according to Harry DeAngelo, Linda DeAngelo and Douglas J. 
Skinner (1996), dividend increases cannot simply be the delayed responses to 
previous earnings. First, they discover that managers actually accelerate the dividend 
increases by larger dollars or percentage amounts in Year O (the initial year of 
earnings declined after consistent earnings growth over at least 10 years). Second, it 
shows no sign that firms which increase dividends in Year O are those for which their 
prior dividend increases lag their prior earnings growth. Last, they find no significant 
relation between prior years' earnings and dividend growth rates for the dividend 
increases sub sample. 
To conclude, modern researches show that dividend fails to be a good predictor 
of future earnings. However, whether they are lagged responses of the present or past 
earnings, a good deal more investigations are needed in order to answer this question. 
Furthermore, a number of economists do cast doubts on the existence of dividend 
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signal. Easterbrook (1984) argues that on one hand, the messages that dividends 
convey are ambiguous, as prosperous firms may withhold cash for internal financing 
rather than paying high dividends if the flotation cost is high, while poor firms that 
should disinvest or liquidate may choose dividends as an accomplishment. On the 
other hand, there are cheaper methods available which can achieve similar functions, 
for instance, to issue disclosures of profits and prospects which have been examined 
by auditors. Also, firms with long records of prosperity, persistent reports of auditors 
and security dealers, stock prices and apparent marketing success of firms would be 
more than enough to verify managers' tales. Owing to all these dividend-signaling 
problems, Easterbrook then shed light on the agency cost model which is the 
mainstream of current economic thought and it is discussed below. 
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2.5 Agency Cost Theory 
2.5.1 Theoretical Models 
Frank H. Easterbrook (1984) states two main sources of agency problems. The 
first one is the cost of monitoring managers. Managers may reap gains and pursue 
their own interest at the expense of shareholders. The second source of agency cost is 
risk aversion of managers. They tend to select safe yet low expected return projects 
because they may lose jobs and any wealth that tied up in their firms' stocks if the 
firms operate poorly or even go bankrupt. Their actions contrast unfavorably with 
shareholders' preferences since shareholders with diversified portfolio would like 
managers to be risk-loving. However, if managers acquire riskier ventures, 
bondholders would bear part of the risk of failure but they get no extra premium in 
return. Consequently, there is always a risk struggling among the managers, 
shareholders and bondholders. 
By paying dividends continuously and compelling firms to raise new capital in 
the market regularly so as to keep on firms' activities can help alleviate the above 
agency problems. In this way, investment banks, other financial intermediaries and 
so as the new investors will then monitor firms' affairs when they issue new shares. 
Firms themselves have incentives to reduce agency cost as well, since they want to 
attract the highest possible prices for their new instruments. In addition, the debt-
equity ratio can be frequently adjusted so that neither shareholders nor bondholders 
are taking advantage of the other group. 
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Finally, this agency cost theory seems to match the present observation of 
dividend policy. A fast-growing firm usually pays a low or no dividend due to the 
fact that dividend itself becomes worthless in this case when the firm has been driven 
to the capital market constantly in order to support its expansion. A mature firm pays 
a higher dividend because dividend is necessary to be an agency-cost control device 
when firm's growth rate declines. This theory thus helps explain why firm pays out 
dividends and raises fund in the market simultaneously. Nonetheless, a good deal 
more empirical tests should be done in order to ensure the relevance of this theory. 
Another agency cost model written by Michael C. Jensen (1986) is about free 
cash flow, which is the cash flow in excess of what required in funding all projects 
with positive NPV. Substantial free cash flow creates conflicts between shareholders 
and managers. The former is troubled by how to motivate the latter to disgorge the 
free cash flow so that the money is not invested in projects which are below cost of 
capital or wasted in organization inefficiencies. 
Payout policy can help solve this problem. Paying dividends to shareholders can 
decrease the resources under manager's control, thereby reduce manager's power, 
and incur the monitoring of the capital market when firm seeks new funding. It is a 
crucial decision especially for the slow-growing firms with large sum of free cash 
flow. So, it is no wonder why they pay higher dividends than those fast-growing 
firms do. 
Beyond what cited above, this free cash flow theory also predicts that except for 
firms with profitable unfunded investment projects, prices will rise with increases in 
1 6 
payouts. On the contrary, investors will punish dividend cuts or new requests for 
funds with enormous stock price reductions since this phenomenon is a symptom of 
severe agency problem. 
But in fact in this paper, Jensen suggests that debt is an effective substitute for 
dividend. Debt is a bonding promise to pay out future cash flows to the holders since 
holders have the right to take the firm into bankruptcy court if the managers fail to 
fulfill their promises to make interest and principle payments. In so doing, debt can 
lessen the agency costs of free cash flow by reducing the cash available for spending 
at the discretion of managers. 
However, the truth is that the focus of interest of both the equity and debt 
investors are unlike, as their risk preferences and expected returns are quite distinct. 
In fact, equity and debt are two separate choices of investment. How can we say that 
one should replace another? 
Jeffrey Zwiebel (1996) expresses an opinion which partly agrees yet partly 
disagrees with Jensen's sight. He supports to the extent that debt constrains 
manager's access to free cash due to the threat of bankruptcy, and the accompanied 
loss of managerial entrenchment. Hence，debt serves as a voluntary self-constraint 
which allows manager to prevent the control challenge of takeover. 
Nevertheless, Zwiebel poses a view, which is different from the one proposed by 
Jensen, that debt should coordinate with dividend policy rather than to have debt 
alone. Zwiebel thinks that debt and dividend are linked together in an important 
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manner that cash in hand must not be large enough to pay off debt as debt restricts 
managers credibly from undertaking bad projects. Paying out earnings through 
dividend is a remedy to avoid takeover. Thus, this offers a hope to understand why 
managers voluntarily choose both to have debt and pay out dividends. Zwiebel even 
claims it as the capital structure, which is an optimal dynamically consistent policy 
for entrenched management, that managers choose at the beginning of each period in 
order to maximize their empire-building ambitions with respect to secure an ample 
efficiency to avert control challenges. 
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2.5.2 The Latest Agency Cost Model 
Recently, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-De-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer and 
Robert W. Vishny (2000) (henceforth referred to as LLSV) published a paper on 
agency cost model. The approach used in this paper is a bit different from the above 
literatures by Easterbrook (1984), Jensen (1986) and Zwiebel (1996), which are 
theoretical models concentrate on the mechanism of how dividend policies address 
agency problems. Whereas, what LLSV have done is the empirical research lays 
stress on identifying the elements which affect the payout policies around the world. 
Before discussing in depth about this paper, we should know first the association 
between agency problems and legal regimes. LLSV think that law is one of the 
solutions to agency problems, as it gives rights to shareholders to protect their 
investments against expropriation by managers. As stated in LLSV (1997，1998), 
legal protection of shareholders differs greatly across countries. In general, 
commercial laws vary systematically by two broad traditions: common law, which is 
English origin, and civil law, which originates from Roman law. Within the civil 
tradition, there are three major families: French, German and Scandinavian. 
English law is common law made by judges who have to resolve specific 
disputes and subsequently incorporated the precedents from the judicial decisions 
into legislature. Common law has spread to the British colonies, including the United 
States, Canada, Australia, India and Hong Kong etc. 
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French, German and Scandinavian laws, in contrast, use statues and 
comprehensive codes as a primary means of ordering legal material, and principally 
depend on legal scholars and legislators to formulate their rules (Merryman, 1969). 
French Commercial Code was written under Napoleon in 1807 and expended by his 
military to Belgium, Netherlands, part of Poland, Italy, and western regions of 
Germany. 
The German Commercial Code was composed in 1897 after Bismarck，s 
unification of Germany. It has a vital influence to the legal theory and doctrine in 
Austria, Czechoslovakia, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Switzerland, Yugoslavia, Japan, 
and Korea and Taiwan. The Scandinavian origin is the least derivative from the 
Roman law among the three families (Zweigert and Kotz, 1987). Nordic countries 
such as Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden are classified as Scandinavian 
family. To categorize countries into these three legal families, LLSV mainly rely on 
Reynolds and Flores (1989). 
Concerning the measurement, they intend to find out how legal rights that 
pertained to shareholders enable them to extract returns on their investments from the 
insiders. First, they know for each country the legal origin of the Company Law or 
Commercial Code. Second, they have a survey-based estimate of the quality of law 
enforcement i.e. the "rule of law”，which is an assessment by investors in different 
countries of the law and order environment they operate in. Such a source is 
extracted from the International Country Risk Guide. Third, they measure how well 
legal rules themselves protect shareholders in varies countries. They examine 
whether the requirement that each ordinary share carries only one vote in the 
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country's commercial law exists. They also construct an antidirector rights index. 
The index aggregates six elements of minority shareholder rights from company law 
or commercial code: (1) country allows shareholders to mail their proxy vote; (2) 
shareholders are not required to deposit their shares prior to the general shareholders' 
meeting; (3) cumulative voting or proportional representation of minorities on the 
board of directors is allowed; (4) an oppressed minorities mechanism is in place; (5) 
the minimum percentage of share capital that entitles a shareholder to call for an 
extraordinary shareholders' meeting is less than or equal to 10 percent (the sample 
median); (6) shareholders have preemptive rights that can be waived only by a 
shareholders meeting (LLSV，1997). 
Their results confirm that shareholders in different legal jurisdictions are entitled 
to very different bundles of rights, which are ascertained by laws rather than inherent 
in equity itself. The findings show that common law countries protect shareholders 
the most, French civil law countries the least, and German civil law and 
Scandinavian civil law countries in the middle. The quality of law enforcement is the 
highest in Scandinavian and German civil law countries, next in common law 
countries and again the lowest in French civil law countries (LLSV, 1998). They also 
find strong evidence that countries with weaker investors protections, have smaller 
size and breadth of both equity and debt markets. Especially, French civil law 
countries have both the weakest investor protections and the least developed capital 
markets (LLSV, 1997). But how do all these results relate to dividend policy? 
The legal protection of shareholders varies across legal regimes, the severity of 
agency problems exposed to shareholders then differs, thus, the dividend policies are 
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also different in different countries so as to fix different agency problem. In LLSV 
(2000)，two alternative dividend agency models have been proposed: (1) Outcome 
model and (2) Substitute model. 
For the outcome model, shareholders utilize their legal powers to force 
companies to disgorge cash flow. So, dividends are "outcomes" of legal protection. 
This model predicts that in countries with good shareholder protection, the dividend 
payout ratios are higher for the mature firms. For those fast-growing companies, 
shareholders are willing to accept low dividends and high reinvestment rate from 
companies with good investment opportunities, since they are confident that they 
could extract high payouts when companies，investment payoff. However, for 
countries with poor shareholder protection, shareholders would try to get whatever 
they can, regardless of the investment opportunities. 
Considering the substitute model, firms try to establish their reputation for good 
treatment of shareholders so as to raise external fund on attractive terms through 
paying dividends. Hence, dividends are "substitutes" for effective legal protection. In 
particular for firms in weak legal protection environments, they pay higher dividends 
than the firms that are under a more protective legal system do. Firms with better 
growth prospects even have higher payouts owing to the fact that they have much 
stronger incentives to build up reputation because they have greater potential needs 
for external finance. But on the other side, those fast-growing firms have more 
effective uses of funds than the slow-growing ones. Thereby, the effect of the rapid 
growth firms on the payout level is ambiguous. 
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Empirically, the dividend policies of more than 4000 firms from 33 countries 
around the world are put to tests. The conclusive result shows that agency approach 
is highly relevant in understanding the corporate dividend policies around the world, 
and evidence shows consistent support for the outcome agency model. For the 
common law countries with better shareholder protection, firms pay higher dividends 
than the civil law countries do. Fast growth firms under common law regimes pay 
lower dividends than the slow growth firms do as well. For the poorly protected 
shareholders in civil law countries, they seem to take whatever dividends they can 
get immediately no matter what investment opportunities the companies have. 
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2.6 Residual Theory 
The word "residual" implies “leftover” and the residual theory implies that 
dividend is the payout of the "leftover" cash flow after the corporations have iunded 
all the positive NPV projects (Brigham and Houston, 1998). This is in fact similar to 
Jensen's free cash flow theory, which puts forward that free cash flow or residuals 
should pay out to solve agency problem (Jensen, 1986). 
Apart from agency cost, there is an alternative explanation on residual theory. 
Some economists think that most firms use the residual dividend model to set the 
long-run target payout ratio at a level which will permit the firm to satisfy its optimal 
capital budget with retained earnings (Brigham and Houston, 1998). In other words, 
dividend policy is a residual of a capital structure policy. For instance, a firm may 
wish to maintain a certain percent of debt-to-total-capital ratio over a specified 
period, it will then finance half of its new investment needs with borrowed funds and 
half with retained earnings or new share issues. Any remained earnings i.e. residuals 
will be paid out to shareholders as dividends (Megginson, 1997). 
This explanation would also be rational in understanding why firms in young, 
rapid-growing industries retain almost all of their profits and rarely pay out any, 
while firms in mature, slow-growing industries tend to adopt a high payout strategy. 
Nonetheless, some present observations seem to violate this theory. Firms not 
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dividend ratios. What's more, they constantly release dividend payments and 
routinely issue new equity. 
Moreover, the findings of Harry DeAngelo, Linda DeAngelo and Douglas J. 
Skinner (1996) also go against this residual theory. They assess the decrease in the 
amount of capital spending with the aim to investigate whether dividend increases 
are primarily residual payouts rather than superior signals on future earnings. Their 
results show that there is no statistically reliable connection between the dollar 
change in capital outlays and dollar change in dividends. They further find out that 
the median ratio of the dollar dividend increase to the dollar capital expenditure 
reduction is only 5.8 percent, which suggests that managers' main concern is the 
reduction in capital outlays itself instead of financing dividend increases through 
investment reductions. 
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2.7 Other Studies on Dividend Policy 
2.7.1 Low-Regular-Dividend-Plus-Extras Policy 
This is a special kind of dividend policy which was generally adopted by the 
automobile companies like General Motors and Ford in the past. The company 
announces a low and regular dividend that can be maintained no matter what 
conditions, plus when times are good and the company accumulates a surplus of cash 
flow, it will then pay a designated extra dividend. The merit of such a policy is that 
investors will not interpret the extras as a positive signal that the company' s 
earnings will go up permanently and vice versa (Brougham and Houston, 1998). 
；；"；. 
2 6 
, - ^ - r j r - , — 
2.7.2 Comparison of the Dividend Policies of Japanese and U.S. Firms 
Dewenter and Warther (1998) put together the signaling, agency cost and 
residuals theories to compare dividend policies between Japan and U.S. They 
assume that the Japanese firms, particularly the keiretsu-member firms, are subject to 
fewer agency conflicts and less information asymmetry than that of the U.S. firms as 
the level of interaction between managers and shareholders in Japanese firms is 
much more intense. 
Evidence shows that Japanese dividends are less relevant to agency problem and 
contain fewer signals than the U.S. dividends. The former is due to the fact that 
alternative forms of corporate control exist. For the latter one, findings show that 
stock prices react more actively to U.S. companies' dividend omission and initiation 
announcements than to that of the Japanese companies. This can be explained by the 
fact that Japanese keiretsu shareholders have much longer investment horizons than 
their U.S. counterparts (Gerlach, 1992, Kang and Stulz, 1996). Thus, Japanese 
shareholders are less interested in short-term dividend signals since any asymmetric 
information will eventually be revealed regardless of the firm's dividend policy. 
Also, they find that Japanese dividends are more responsive to earnings than the U.S. 
dividends as the Japanese firms are less reluctant to omit and cut dividends. This may 
be owing to the reason that dividend changes in Japan are driven by changes in 
residual earnings. 
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Chapter 3 Methodology 
3.1 Model 
Since most if not all firms pay dividends though they are costly, there must be 
some reasons. Many economists agree that signaling theory is no longer appropriate 
and both the agency cost theory and residual theory seem to be the most relevant 
explanations of the current observation of dividend policy. Therefore, in this model, 
the anti-signaling hypothesis is included to show that it is also invalid in Hong Kong. 
Both the agency cost and the residual hypotheses are incorporated in the model to 
test their relevancy. Besides, the investment opportunities hypothesis is added to the 
model as well. Thus, a Four-Hypothesis Model is developed. Table 1 summarizes the 
variable used and the prediction of each hypothesis towards the dividend payout ratio 
variable. 
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3.2 Anti-Signaling Hypothesis 
The signaling theory tells that companies use dividend as a signal on future 
earnings growth due to the asymmetric information of investors about their 
profitability. However, modern research shows limited support that dividend is a 
good predictor of future corporate earnings. The findings of Harry DeAngelo, Linda 
DeAngelo and Douglas J. Skinner (1996) suggest all but no indication that 
management's decisions on dividend changes are favorable signals of the future 
income prospects. Shlomo Benartzi, Roni Michaely and Richard Thaler (1997) fails 
to provide any evidence to reveal that dividend announcements have information 
content on the changes of both the magnitude and the sign of the future earnings as 
well. In fact, all these lead to the view that dividend is not a leading indicator. 
Therefore, so as to confirm whether this phenomenon is also true for the companies 
in Hong Kong, the anti-signaling hypothesis is proposed accordingly which is against 
the signaling theory and suggests dividend does not succeed in signifying companies' 
future profits prospects in Hong Kong. The total income growth rate is preferable to 
total earnings growth rate as the independent variable of this anti-signaling 
hypothesis because earnings are easily manipulated by accounting practices. 
2 9 : 
. — •二 
3.3 Agency Cost Hypothesis 
Agency cost theory claims that paying dividend is a remedy for the agency 
problem between corporate insiders and outside shareholders as the former would 
then become less capable of using the corporate earnings to benefit themselves. 
According to the latest agency cost model published by Rafael La Porta, Florencio 
Lopez-De-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer and Robert W. Vishny (2000), the legal origin of 
each country serves as a proxy for the protection of outside shareholders because 
shareholders in different legal jurisdictions are entitled to different bundles of rights. 
Shareholders can make use of their legal rights to compel companies to release 
proceeds on their investments and thereby protect them against the expropriation by 
managers. Dividends are thus the “outcomes，，of legal protection and the dividend 
payout ratios are higher in countries with good shareholder protection. 
But here in this four-hypothesis model, the outside shareholders protection is 
measured in terms of the family shareholders shareholding. Such a proxy is chosen 
because family shareholders on the board of directors tend to collude to vote for 
decisions which might be against the interests of outside shareholders. In Hong Kong, 
each share carries only one vote. If the family concentration is over 50 percent, that 
means, the total percentage of vote of outside shareholders must be less than the 
family shareholders. As a result, it is more difficult for them to extract earnings from 
the insiders. Hence, this hypothesis expresses that the higher the family shareholding, 
the lower the outside shareholders protection, and the lesser the dividend payouts. In 
the later chapter, another shareholders protection proxy, the substantial shareholders 
concentration is used instead to analyze its impact towards the dividend payout ratio. 
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3.4 Residual Hypothesis 
The residual theory states that corporations pay out the cash flow in excess 
after they have funded all the positive NPV projects. One of the well-known 
explanations on such behavior is by Michael C. Jensen (1986). He said massive free 
cash flow would induce a clash of interests between shareholders and managers. 
Shareholders are thereby anxious about the ways to motivate the managers to 
disgorge the residual cash flow so that resources are less likely of being wasted in 
organization inefficiencies and low returns projects. To see whether similar situation 
applies to the companies in Hong Kong, the residual hypothesis puts forward that 
corporations with more free cash flow would pay more dividends. In order to test this 
hypothesis, the effect of free cash flow growth rate on dividend payout ratio is 
measured. The definition of free cash flow growth is provided in Chapter 4. 
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3.5 Investment Opportunities Hypothesis 
A worldwide pattern that younger and rapidly growing companies pay fewer 
dividends than those mature and slowly growing companies seems to exist nowadays. 
Since the growth stage of companies is usually associated with investment 
opportunities, fast growing companies generally have better investment opportunities 
and vice versa. Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-De-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer and 
Robert W. Vishny (2000) (henceforth referred to as LLSV) empirically find strong 
evidence that companies with better investment opportunities have lower dividend 
payout ratios because shareholders believe that when these companies' investments 
pay off，they could extract high dividends. So they are willing to accept low dividend 
payouts temporarily. As a result, the investment hypothesis predicts that companies 
in Hong Kong with good investment opportunities also have a lower dividend payout 
as they retain earnings for future investments. The principal measure of investment 
opportunities in LLSV (2000) is the sales growth rate. But here in the four-
hypothesis model, the fixed assets growth rate is used instead. It is because it is 
commonly believed that the greater the investment opportunities, the quicker the firm 
expands, and the faster the growth of fixed assets that a firm possesses. 
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3.6 Industry Control 
Since different industries might be at different stages of maturity and growth 
that would affect the dividend policies, seven broad industries are integrated into the 






(6) Utilities, and 
(7) Transportation. 
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3.7 The Four-Hypothesis Model 
Formally, the Four-Hypothesis Model is written as 
DP = a +Pl5feTIG+ p2*FSC+ P3 5feFCFG+ (34*FAG + p5*TECH + p6*CONG + 
P7*MAN + p8*FIN + |39*PROP + (3 IO5feUTIL + (3115feTRAN + 8 
where a is a constant, 
8 is an error term, 
DP is the dividend payout ratio variable, 
TIG is the total income growth variable, 
FSC is the family shareholders concentration variable, 
FCFG is the free cash flow growth variable, 
FAG is the fixed assets growth variable, 
TECH is technology industry dummy variable, 
CONG is conglomerates industry dummy variable, 
MAN is manufacturing industry dummy variable, 
FIN is finance industry dummy variable, 
PROP is property industry dummy variable, 
UTIL is utilities industry dummy variable, and 
TRAN is transportation industry dummy variable. 
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Chapter 4 Sample and Data Description 
4.1 Sample Description 
The data sample is constructed by the 33 constituents of the Hang Seng Index 
plus the 50 companies incorporated in the Hang Seng Midcap 50 Index listed in the 
Stock Exchange of Hong Kong. The data are mainly collected from three sources: 
the annual report of each company, the Datastream International database, and the 
Wardleycards issued by HSBC Broking (Data Services) Limited. From the original 
sample set, seven companies which have not yet been listed in 1996 are eliminated, 
and a database with a total of 76 companies is yielded eventually. 
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4.2 Variable Description 
The Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression on a cross section of 
companies is the major tool for investigation. Table 2 summarizes the construction of 
variables and the table in Appendix 1 shows the complete dataset. The dependent 
variable is the dividend payout ratio in 1996. Its numerator is dividends per share, 
where interim dividend and final dividend are included except for the cash bonus and 
the special dividends. The denominator is the net earnings per share, which is the net 
profit after tax but before extraordinary items divided by the average number of 
shares in issues during 1996. Such a dividends-to-earnings ratio is the most common 
measure of dividend payouts. 
The following presents the independent variables of the anti-signaling, 
agency cost, residual and investment opportunities hypotheses. 
Firstly, for the anti-signaling hypothesis, the average annual total income 
growth rate over the four-year period from 1996 to 1999 acts as an indication to find 
out whether dividends can convey information about company's future prospect. 
Total income refers to the total revenues for the financial period. The advantage of 
using total income instead of total earnings is that total income is harder to 
manipulate or smooth through accounting practices. 
Secondly, the shareholding concentration of family shareholders is applied as 
a major proxy for the minority shareholders protection in the agency cost hypothesis. 
The total percentage of shareholding of each family member represented on the 
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board of directors is added up. The information of the relationship among directors is 
acquired from companies' latest annual reports in order to identify those who have 
family relationship. The percentage of shareholding of every family member is 
obtained from Wardleycards (9/2000 version), which is the sum of personal shares, 
family shares and corporate shares owned by a family member divided by the total 
number of shares in issues during the financial period. An alternative measure of 
outside shareholders protection is also presented in the next chapter. 
Thirdly, the item of "total cash and equivalent" in the Datastream 
International database is picked to denote the free cash flow in the residual 
hypothesis. It is in general defined as the cash and bank balances, and the short-term 
investments or trading securities shown within current assets. The average annual 
percentage growth in total cash and equivalent over the four-year period from 1996 
to 1999 is computed to signify the free cash flow variable of this hypothesis. 
Fourthly, concerning the investment opportunities hypothesis, the average 
annual growth rate of the net total fixed assets over the four-year period from 1996 to 
1999 is selected to capture the investment opportunities across firms. The fixed 
assets growth is positively related with the firm size. As investment opportunities 
increase, firm tends to expand faster, which implies that the fixed assets also grow 
faster. 
Furthermore, the definitions of some of the above variables including the 
dividend payout ratio, total income, total cash and equivalent, and the net total fixed 
assets are based on the interpretation of Datastream International database. For 
detailed description of each variable in different sectors, please refer to Appendix 2. 
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Finally, since companies are industry specific, they certainly have some 
effects on the dividend policies. Thus, seven industry dummies are also included in 
the regression as control variables. They are: (1) technology, (2) conglomerates, (3) 
manufacturing, (4) finance, (5) property, (6) utilities, and (7) transportation. The 
industry dummy is equal to one if the firm is of that industry, and zero otherwise. 
Note that the sectors of information technology, telecommunications, electric and 
electronics are under the industry of technology; the sectors of both banking and 
finance are attributed to the industry of finance; and the sectors of both property and 
construction are belonged to the industry of property. The categorization of firms 
into different sectors is relied on Wardleycards' classification. 
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4.3 Limitations 
First, the total income growth rate counts on the past as a proxy for the ftiture. 
Measuring investment opportunities in terms of growth in fixed assets has the similar 
problem. 
Second, the free cash flow and earnings per share have the potential problem 
of being easily manipulated by accounting tricks. Thus, they may not be exactly 
comparable across firms. 
Third, the financial period of each company is not the same. Actually, the 
company account data obtained from Datastream International database are the year-
end (31st December) data. But in fact, those company data are come from companies' 
annual reports with different financial periods. Most companies have their financial 
periods from December to December, but some from March to March, and others 
from June to June. According to the definition given by Datastream International 
database, if the company's financial period is ended on the first half of the year i.e. 
between January and June, it will be considered as ended on the 31st December of the 
previous year; whereas, if the financial period is ended on the second half of the year, 
i.e. between July and December, it will be regarded as ended on 31st December of 
this year. For example: The financial period of Hang Lung Development Company 
Limited (Code: 10) is ended on 30th June. Its dividend payout ratio as at 31st 
December 1996 quoted by the Datastream International database is actually the data 
as at 30th June 1997 presented in the annual report. 
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Next, one of the problems on family concentration is that for those companies 
owned by two or more families, only the one with the highest percentage of family 
shareholding is chosen to be the representative data of the agency cost hypothesis. 
Last, the trickiest measurement problem is to determine the family 
shareholding of each company, especially for those whose shares are substantially 
held by another corporation (say, Company B). For some companies, it is difficult to 
seek out the family shareholding of Company B. For instance, Mr. Cheng B. M., one 
of the directors of Wheelock And Company Limited (Code: 20) holds 0.42 percent of 
corporate shares. This means Wheelock is held by one or certain corporations that 
Mr. Cheng B. M. was entitled to exercise some voting power. However, it is difficult 
to trace the family concentration of those corporations. 
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4.4 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 3 and Chart 1 present the dividend payout ratios of 83 companies 
including 33 companies of the Hang Seng Index and 50 companies of Hang Seng 
Midcap 50 Index over the period from 1992 to 1999. Excluding 10 companies which 
pay no dividend and 2 companies which started to be listed in Year 2000, the 
standard deviation over mean ratio for the rest of each company is computed. The 
ratios of 44 companies out of the total of 71 are under 1. Within the 44 companies, 
the ratios of 35 of them are under 0.5. The implication of these results is that 
companies in Hong Kong have a rather steady dividend payout throughout years. 
Also, the earnings growth rate and the dividend payout ratio of 33 Hang Seng 
Index constituents over the period from 1996 to 1999 are compared. The former is 
shown in Table 4 and Chart 2, and the latter is presented in Table 5 and Chart 3. By 
looking at the standard deviation over mean ratios, only 2 out of 33 companies have 
the ratios in the range of 1 to -1 in the earnings growth table. Contrarily, there are 
merely 3 companies with their standard deviation over mean ratios larger than 1 in 
the dividend payout table. Besides, by comparing Chart 2 and Chart 3，we can see 
that despite the fluctuations of the earnings growth rate as the Asian Financial Crisis 
broke out in 1997, the dividend payout ratios of the companies are still quite stable. 
All these statistics suggest that although the earnings per share decreased because of 
the financial turmoil, the dividends per share have just been reduced proportionally 
in order to keep the dividend payout ratio more or less constant. Such behavior may 
have an advantage of maintaining investors' confidence towards the companies. 
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Chapter 5 Empirical Analysis 
This section is divided into two parts. In the first part, results and implications 
of regressions on a cross section of companies that control for the industry effects are 
presented. In the second part, the outcomes of using an alternative measurement for 
the agency cost hypothesis are reported. 
5.1 Regression Results and Implications 
Table 6 shows the OLS regression results based on the Newey-West 
adjustment for serial correlation and heteroscedasticity across 76 firms in Hong 
Kong. For Test 1, considering first the anti-signaling hypothesis, the total income 
growth coefficient is negative and significant at the 1 percent level. It implies that the 
dividend payout does not increase with the future income growth. Thus, the 
hypothesis that dividends cannot convey messages about firm's future profit prospect 
is true. It is explicable why dividend fails to be a proper signal. Prosperous firms tend 
to withhold cash for future investment rather than pay out more cash, whereas poor 
performed firms maybe more eager to distribute dividend due to the lack of 
investment opportunities. The result of the investment opportunities hypothesis 
shown below is good evidence. Also, the poor firms, perhaps, have stronger 
incentive to pay out dividends than the better-performed firms, as they want to give 
the impression to the investors that they are not too bad. Furthermore, there are 
simpler and cheaper ways to reveal firms' performance. The most direct and easiest 
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method is by releasing to the public the profit and prospect reports which have been 
scrutinized by auditors. 
For the agency cost hypothesis, the family shareholders concentration 
variable gives a negative but statistically insignificant coefficient. The negative sign 
can be interpreted as some support for the hypothesis that the higher the family 
shareholdings, the lower the outside shareholders protection and the lower the 
dividend payout. If the family shareholders are holding a large number of shares, 
they will have more tendencies to collude. In this way, the outside shareholders 
beyond doubt have less number of votes to elect the directors who are more likely to 
speak for their interests, or to vote for decisions in favor of their interests, such as 
requesting for more dividends. Hence, lower dividend payout is resulted. 
Nonetheless, the insignificancy of the coefficient may indicate that the effect 
is ambiguous. Another proxy, the substantial shareholders concentration, is thereby 
used to assess the relevancy of this hypothesis in the next subsection. 
Concerning the free cash flow growth variable, its coefficient is positive and 
significant at the 1 percent level. This outcome is consistent with the residual 
hypothesis that the more the extra cash flow, the more the dividends the companies 
are willing to pay. This implies that firms in Hong Kong are willing to share their 
investment returns with the shareholders when they do have excessive cash flow 
after financing those NPV projects. Undeniably, this can give a good impression to 
the stockholders that they have invested in a good firm and thus they are confident to 
keep on putting money in this firm. 
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Regarding the investment opportunities hypothesis, the fixed assets growth 
coefficient is negative and highly statistically significant at the 1 percent level. This 
means that firms with superior investment opportunities do pay fewer dividends. Its 
implication is that stockholders do not mind in receiving lower cash payout in the 
present if they can foresee that the investment opportunities of a firm is good in the 
future. It is because they think that they could extract a higher dividend after the 
firm's investments payoff. In fact, they are merely hoping for a better future return at 
the expense of the very little or even no payout in the present. 
About the industry control variables, both the technology and conglomerates 
dummies enter with the negative signs, and for the rest of the industry dummies, they 
are positively related with the dividend payout. However，the only statistically 
significant (at the 5 percent level) dummy is technology. This implies that the 
phenomenon of technology industry paying relatively lower dividends is a 
remarkable dividend policy pattern in Hong Kong. 
Test 2 which presents the results of the four hypotheses plus the technology 
dummy strengthens the findings in Test 1. All coefficients have roughly the same 
magnitudes as in Test 1，and furthermore, with increase in significance since all of 
them are statistically significant at the 1 percent level except for the family 
shareholders concentration variable. What's more, though the R-Square decreases 
from 0.3708 in Test 1 to 0.3362 in Test 2 due to the omission of some control 
variables, the R-Bar-Square increases from 0.2626 in Test 1 to 0.2888 in Test 2 
owing to the enhancement of the variables' significance. 
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5.2 Alternative Measurement for Agency Cost Hypothesis 
In Table 7, the substantial shareholders concentration rate replaces the family 
shareholders concentration rate as a proxy for the outside shareholders protection in 
the agency cost hypothesis, and the variables for the rest of the hypotheses are 
remained unchanged. The percentages of shareholding of the top five substantial 
shareholders sourced from Wardleycards (9/2000 version) are summed up. A 
dummy equals to one if the total percentage is equal to or greater than 50 percent, 
and zero otherwise. A series of regressions similar to the above subsection is 
performed. 
As shown in Table 7，all coefficients have exactly the same sign as in Table 6 
except for conglomerates which is positive here. Concerning the T-ratios, the 
coefficients of the anti-signaling, residual and investment opportunities hypotheses 
are again significant at the 1 percent level, and the technology dummy is also 
significant at the 5 percent level in Test 1 and at the 1 percent level in Test 2. 
Particularly note that the substantial shareholders concentration variable in this case 
is still statistically insignificant. Hence, there is no difference between the results in 
Table 6 and Table 7. 
In fact, the magnitude of the substantial shareholders concentration 
coefficient also changes appreciably. By comparing Test 2 in Tables 6 and 7, the 
family shareholders concentration coefficient is -0.0006 in Table 6，whereas the 
substantial shareholders concentration coefficient is -0.0584 in Table 7. But the 
magnitudes of the remaining independent variables do not vary much. So, the 
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substantial shareholders concentration is not a good substitute for the family 
shareholders concentration. Perhaps, both the family shareholders concentration and 
substantial shareholders concentration measurements cannot perfectly capture the 
differences of the outside shareholders protection among firms. As a result, 
significant findings are hard to obtain. 
To summarize, despite the measurement adjustment, it indeed does not 
change the thrust of results given in the previous subsection. The results are 
consistent with the signaling，residual, investment opportunities hypotheses and the 
technology industry phenomenon, and the agency cost hypothesis is still subjected to 
fbrther investigation. Several non-nested tests are performed in Appendix 3 which 
support the regression results. 
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5.3 Comparison of Dividend Policies of Hong Kong and the World 
Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-De-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer and Robert W. 
Vishny (henceforth referred to as LLSV) published a paper called "Agency Problem 
and Dividend Policies around the World" in 2000 shows that agency cost theory is 
highly relevant in understanding the corporate dividend policies around the world. 
For most common law countries with better shareholder protection, firms are willing 
to pay higher dividends than the civil law countries do. Accordingly，Hong Kong7 
which is under a common law regime, also conform to this phenomenon. 
Nevertheless, there is no supportive evidence in my research to show that agency 
cost hypothesis is a correct approach to explain the dividend policy in Hong Kong. 
So, the result concerning the agency cost theory applied to Hong Kong is mixed and 
more investigation is needed. 
Also, LLSV (2000) find out that the fast-growing firms in common law 
countries pay lower dividends than that of the slow-growing firms. Indeed, the result 
of the investment opportunities hypothesis in my model is consistent with their 
findings as well. Thus, investment opportunities hypothesis seems to be relevant to 
explain the dividend policies in Hong Kong as well as around the world's common 
law countries. 
Furthermore, Dewenter and Warther (1998) discover that residual theory is 
more relevant to explain the dividend policy in Japan, while agency cost theory is 
applicable to the dividend policy in U.S. due to the difference in terms of corporate 
control between the two countries. In order to know more about which hypothesis is 
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specific to Hong Kong, a great deal of tests of comparison should be performed 
among different countries. 
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Chapter 6 Conclusion 
Last but not the least, this thesis uses a sample of 76 Hong Kong listed firms 
to shed light on the dividend policy in Hong Kong. The cross-sectional regression 
results on the four-hypothesis model tell us that the anti-signaling hypothesis， 
residual hypothesis, investment opportunities hypothesis and the technology industry 
phenomenon are relevant explanations of the dividend patterns in Hong Kong. Firms 
do not make use of dividend policy as a signal of firms' profitability. In fact, what 
affect the corporate dividend decisions the most are the free cash flow growth and 
the investment opportunities growth. Also, there is no conclusive evidence on the 
agency cost hypothesis no matter which measurement - family shareholders 
concentration or substantial shareholders concentration is used. Therefore, we still do 
not know whether firms in Hong Kong pay out cash to resolve the agency problem. 
Table 8 presents the summary of regression results. 
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Table 1 Summary of the Four-Hypothesis Model 
Hypothesis Variable Description 
Anti-signaling Total Income Growth Rate T I G个边 DPi 
(TIG) 
Agency Cost Family Shareholders F S C t ^ D P i 
Concentration (FSC) -
Residual Free Cash Flow Growth Rate F C F G t ^ D P t 
(FCFG) 
Investment Fixed Assets Growth Rate F A G t ^ D P I 
Opportunities (FAG) 
5 0 
Table 2 Construction of Variables 
Hypothesis Variable Description Source 
(Dependent Dividend Dividends per share* as a Datastream 
Variable) Payout Ratio percentage of net earnings per International 
(DP) share* in 1996. Database 
Anti- Total Income Average annual percentage growth Datastream 
Signaling Growth Rate in total income* over the period International 
(TIG) 1996-1999. Database 
Agency Cost Family Sum of personal shares, family Wardleycards 
Shareholders shares and corporate shares owned (9/2000 
Concentration by family shareholders as a version) and 
(FSC) percentage of total number of annual 
shares in issues during the reports 
financial period. (2000). 
Residual Free Cash Flow Average annual percentage growth Datastream 
Growth Rate in total cash and equivalent* over International 
(FCFG) the period 1996-1999. Database 
Investment Fixed Assets Average annual percentage growth Datastream 
Opportunities Growth Rate in total net fixed assets* over the International 
(FAG) period 1996-1999. Database 
Industries Technology Equals one if companies belong to Wardleycards 
(TE) sectors of Information (9/2000 
Technology, Telecommunications, version) 
Electric and Electronics, and zero 
otherwise. 
Conglomerates Equals one if companies belong to 
(C) sector of Conglomerates, and zero | ！ 
otherwise. 
Manufacturing Equals one if companies belong to 
(M) sector of Manufacturing, and zero 
otherwise. 
Finance (F) Equals one if companies belong to 
sectors of Banking and Finance, 
and zero otherwise. 
Property (P) Equals one if companies belong to 
sectors of Property and 
Construction，and zero otherwise. 
Utilities (U) Equals one if companies belong to 
sector of Utilities, and zero 
otherwise. 
Transportation Equals one if companies belong to 
( T r ) sector of Transportation, and zero 
otherwise. 
• * See Appendix 2 for detailed description of each variable in different sectors 
according to the definition of Datastream International database. 
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Table 3 Dividend Payout Ratios of 83 Hong Kong Listed Firms from 1992 to 1999 
Company Name 92Vi 93 ^ 4 ¾ 95 96 97 98 99 M SD SD/M 
AMOY PROPERTIES 0.67^ 0.62 0.64 :0.69 0.51: 0.52 0.51 0.86 0.6275 0.119 0.1897 
BANK OF EAST ASIA NTA^ 0.47 0.43 ^0.45 0.46 : 0.46 0.47 0.49 0.4614 0.0186 0.0404 
CATHAY PACIFIC 0.4，： 0.52 0.5 0.46 0.44 0.59 -0.62 0.46 0.3438 0.3936 1.145 
CHEUNG KONG HDG. 0.28:: 0.22 ：0.24 0.24 0.23 0.21 0.44 0.05 0.2388 0.1063 0,4452 
CHEUNG KONG INFR. N/A N/A^N/A 0.21 p 0.28 0.3 0.3 0,2725； 0.0427 0.1568 
CHINA MOBILE (HK) LTD. N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 0 0 0 0 T 0 0 
CHINARES.ENTREP. N/A|:0.35 0.34^0.3 0.22^0.19 0.19 0.19 0.2543 0.0732 0.288 
CITIC PACIFIC N/A 0.35 0.36 ： 0.36 0.19^0.2 0.54 0.3614 0.139 0.3845 
CLP HOLDINGS LTD 0.56 0.54 0.45 |0 .58 0.59 ^0.48 0.72 0.72 0.58 0.0987 0.1702 
DAO HENG BANK GP. N/A; 10.34 0.391 0.35 0.36 I： 0.49 0,52 0.48 0.4186 0.0756 0.1806 
FIRST PACIFIC N / A � N / A ? 0.18 0；31 «0.24 0.04 0.1 0.174^ 0.1076 0.6185 
HANG LUNG DEV. 0.43 0.39 0.41 ; 0.41 0.4 巧 0.4 0.4 0.8 0.455 0.1399 0.3075 
HANG SENG BANK N/A 0.48 0,7： 0.7 0.7 ； 0.7 0.96 0.94 0.74 0.1645 0.2223 
HENDERSON INV. 0,58 ,0.62 0.57 0.57 0.62 ；：0.66 0.56 0.4 0.572^5 0.0776 0.1355 
HENDERSON LD.DEV. 0.44 ： 0.42 0.41 0.39 0.44 0.53 0.48 0.46 0.4463 0.0441 0.0987 
HK.&CHINAGAS 0:48 0.49 0.52 0.53 0.54 a0.57 0.57 0.57 0.5338 0.0358 0.Q671 
HONG KONG ELECTRIC 0.54 0.54 0.52 0.54 0.6 j 0.58 0.58 0.58 0.56 0.0283 0,0505 
HSBC HDG. NTA 0.33 0.34 0.34 0.35 0.4 0.57 ： 0.52 0.4071 0.0979 0.2405 
HUTCHISON WHAMP. 0.55 0.38 0.42 0.45 0.45 ^ 0.49 0.57 0.05 0.42 0.1624 0:3866 
HYSAN DEV. N/A 0.57 0.9 0.86 0.8510.85 0,42 0.34 0.6843 0.2359 03447 
JOHNSON ELECTRIC HDG. 0.27 0.28 0.28 0.35 0.24 ；; 0.26 0.39 0.39 0.3075 0.0599 0.1949 
LEGEND HOLDINGS N/A N/A 0.31 -0.06 0 0.16 0.31 0.63 0.225 0.2508 1.1147 
LI&FUNG 0.44 0.7 0.26 0.69 0.72 ；0.73 0.79 0.76 0.6363 0.1859 0.2921 
NEW WORLD DEV. 039 0.39 0,5 0.47 0.42 0.58 0.48 0.48 0.4638 0.0635 0.1368 
PACIFIC CEN.CYBERWORKS N/A N/A 0.17 0.44 0.53 0 0 0 0.19 0.2395 1.2605 
SHANGHAI INDUSTRIAL HDG. N/A N/A N/A N/A 0.18 0.23 0.24 0.29 0.235 0.0451 0.1919 
SINO LAND 0.38 0.33 0.13 0.45 0.4 0.44 0.22 -0.26 0.3263 0.1139 0.3491 
SMARTONE TELECOM N/A N/A N/A N/A 0.19 0.31 0.37 -0.27 0.15 0.2898 1.9322 
SUN HUNG KAI PROPS. 0.4 0.39 0.39 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.39 0.3963 0.0052 0.0131 
SWIRE PACIFIC 'A' N/A 0.39 0.4 0.39 0.37 0.42 0.74 0.38 0.4414 0.1326 0.3004 
TV.BROADCASTS 0.69 0.65 0.69 0.69 0.7 0.66 0.7 0.68 0.6825 0.0183 0.0268 
WHARF HDG. 0.66 0.67 0.66 0.63 1.09 0.95 0.93 0.56 0.7688 0.1921 0 2499 
WHEELOCK&CO. 0.4 0.33 0.32 0.34 0.35 0.39 0.25 0.21 0.3238 0.065 0.2008 
ALLIED GROUP 0.67 0.47 0.21 0 0 0.11 2.34 0 0.475 0.7925 1.6685 
ASIA LOGISTICS TECHS. N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 0 0 0 0 0 
ASIA ORIENT 1.68 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.21 0.594 2.8284 
ASIA TELE-NET & TECH. 0.25 0 0.19 0 0.09 0.12 0.5 0 0.1438 0.1715 1.1928 
ASM PACIFIC TECH. 0.5 0.44 0.42 0.39 0.49 0.49 0.88 0.4 0.5013 0.1589 0.317 
BEIJING YANHUA 'H' N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 0.24 0.58 0.58 0.4667 0.1963 0.4206 
CENTURY CITY 0.31 0.17 0.16 0.33 0.19 0.1 0 0 0.1575 0.1237 0.7855 
CHINA EASTERN AIRL. 'H' N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 0 0 0 0 0 0 
CHINA INTERNET GLOBAL |N/A N/A 0.03 1 0.05 O Q Q 0.18 0.4022 2.2347 
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Continued - Table 3 
CHINA PHARMACEUTICAL~ IN/A :N/A 0.3 0.43 0.43 ^0.28 0.28 0.26 0.33 0.0785 0.2378 
CHINA RES.BEIJING LAND N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 0.19 0.19 0.19 0 0 
CHINA STHN.AIRL 'H' N/A , N/A N/A N/A N/A ：0 0 0 0 0 0 
CHINA STAR ENTERTAINMENr N/A 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
CITY TELECOM N/A f N/A N/A 5 N/A N/A J0.54 0.66 0.66 Q.62 0.0693 0,1117 
COMPUTER & TECHNOLOGIES N/AS N/A N/A 1 N/A N/A ^ N/A 0 ： 0.24 0.12 0.1697 1.4142 
DENWAY MOTORS LTD. WA^, 0.28 -0.04 0 0 | o 0 0 0 .03¾ 0.1094 3.19 
ESUNHDG. LTD. 0 0 0 0 0.32 0.32 :-0.37 0 0.0338 0.218 6.4585 
FPB BANK N/A N/A 0.4 0.35 0.31 0.3 0.29 0.41 0.3433 0.052 0.1515 
GUANGSHEN RAILWAY 'H' N/A N/A N/A:; N/A 0.36 0.63 0 0 0.2475 0.3063 1.2376 
HENGANINTL.GP. N/A|i;N/A N/A； N/A N/A：?N/A 0 ; _ � 0 . 8 4 0 . 4 2 0 . 5 9 4 1.4142 
HINET HOLDINGS LTD. 0.61 ^ 0.59 0.51v 0.8 0.44 0 0 :: 0 0:3(588 0.3221 0.8734 
HING KONG HOLDINGS 8.3¾ 0.39 0.35 | o 0 , � 0 . 2 5 0 : 0.55 1.23 � 2.8642 2.3286 
HK.& SHAI. HOTEL 0.5 C 0.52 0.51 0.5 0.48 5 3.9 -0.03 0.1 0.81 1.2668 1.5639 
HOPEWELL HDG. 0.72 0.65 0.41 0.34 -0.23 -0.03 0.62 0.57 0,3813 0.3433 0.9004 
IDTINTL. NTA 0.39 0.33 :0.5 0.17 0.44 0.43 0.39 0.3786 0.1059 0.2797 
INTL.BANK OF ASIA N/A N/A 0.4 0.39 0.38 0.41 0；65 2.46 0:7817 0.8286 1.06 
JCG HOLDINGS N/A 0.45 0.44 0.45 0.46 0.5 0.56 0.39 0,4643 0.0532 0.1146 
LIU CHONG HING BANK N/A N/A 0.26 0.43 0.45 0.45 0.51 0.51 0.435 0.092 0.2116 
NEW WORLD CHINA LAND 涵 : N / A N/A ^ N/A N/A : N/A N/A 0 (T O 0 
ORIENTAL UNION HDG. N/A ； ：N/A 031 0.35 0.37 0 0 0 04717 0.189 1.1012 
PACIFIC CENTURY IN. N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 0 0 0 0 
PACIFIC CONCORD HDG. 0.32 0.22 0.24 0.5 0.13 0.18 0.22 0 0.2263 0.1447 0.6396 
PROSPER EVISION LTD. N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 0 0 0 0 0 
QINGLING MOTORS 'H' N/A N/A N/A 0.56 0.48 0 0 0 0.208 0.2862 1.376 
RNA HOLDINGS N/A N/A N/A N/A 0.5 0.19 0 0 0.1725 0.236 1.3681 
SHANDONG INTL.POWER 'H' N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 0 0 0 0 
SHUM YIP INVESTMENT N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 0.19 0.3 0.27 0.2533 0.0569 0.2245 
SKYNET (INTL GP) HDG. 推 : N / A N/A N/A 0.13 0.14 0 0 0.0675 0.078 1.1563 
SKYWORTH DIGITAL N/A � N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
SOLARTECH INTL.HDG. N/A N/A N/A N/A 0.22 0.63 0.48 -10.3 -2.23 5.3493 -2.399 
SUNDAY COMMS. N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A : 
SUNWAY INTL. HDG. N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 0.06 0.06 0 0 
TIAN AN CHINA INVS. 0.23 0.31 0.28 0.22 0.33 0.24 0 0 0.2013 0.13 0.6459 
TINGYI CYMN.ISLE.HDG. N/A N/A N/A N/A 0.19 0.37 0 -0.66 -0.025 0.4495 -17.98 
TOP GLORY INTERNATIONAL 0 0.45 0.38 1.04 0.29 0.38 0 0 0.3175 0.3486 1.0979 
VANDA SYSTEMS N/A N/A N/A 0.29 0.28 0.52 0 0 0.218 0.221 1.0135 
WING LUNG BK. N/A 0.35 0.38 0.39 0.39 0.4 0.39 0.36 0.38 0.0183 0.048 
YANZHOU COAL MINING 'H' N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 0.25 0.28 0.265 0.0212 0.08 
YUGANG INTERNATIONAL N/A 0.22 0.26 0.34 0.3 0.51 0 0.3 0.2757 0.1525 0.5532 
ZHEJIANG EXPRESSWAY 'H' |N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 0 0 0 0 0 Q � 
M : Mean SD : Standard Deviation 
Source: Datastream International Database 
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Table 4 Earnings Growth Rate of 33 Hang Seng Index Constituents from 1996 to 1999 
Company Name | 躲 96^  97 J c 98 99|M SD SP/M 
AMOY PROPERTIES -0,0177, 0.35803 0.0174 -0.3511 0.00165 0.28988 175.687 
BANK OF EAST ASIA 0：140^  0.11101 fco.6074S 0.69359 0.08452 0.5334 6.31113 
CATHAY PACIFIC 0.1316 -0.4972 -1.1271； -12.373 -3.4665 5.96008 -1.7193 
CHEUNG KONG HDG. <0.2263 0.22136 ^0.6268 7.78785 1.90218 3.94421 2.07352 
CHINA MOBILE (HK) LTD. 0.0035 0.2102 0.5792 -0.3122 0.12018 0.37391 3.11139 
CHINA RES.ENTREP. 0.4788 1.8381 -0.2877 0.21456 0.56093 0.90887 1,62029 
CITIC PACIFIC y 0.8624 0.19861 -0,4845 -0.0113 0 M l 3 2 0.55921 3.957 
CHEUNG KONG INFR. :0.4573: 1.98966 ,^0.1968 0.09252 0.68408 0.8838 1,29196 
CLP HOLDINGS LTD ^0.1174 0.10589^0.7619 -0.1537 0.14917 0.42431 2,84446 
DAO HENG BANK GP. ^ 0.3465： 0.33304 :0.3917: -0.0351 0.06317 0.35105 5.55705 
FIRST PACIFIC 0,064 0.02179 - ;-0.103 -0.4738 —0.1228 0.24456 ,1.9921 
HANG LUNG DEV. 0,0342' 0.09477 ::厂0.45 -0.1641 -0.1213 0.24545 i-2.0238 
HANG SENG BANK : 0.0787 0.11258 -0.2636 0.22668 0.03858 0.21117 5.47284 
HENDERSON INV. 0.1274 -0.1857 -0,161； 0.00801 ，0.0528 0.14782 -2.7983 
HENDERSON LD.DEV. 0.1875: 0.09304 -0,4431, 0.01448 ^-0.037 0.27983 -7.5579 
HK.& CHINA GAS 0.2023 0.16351 0.094 0.12432 0.14606 0.04708 0.32237 
HONG KONG ELECTRIC '0.0351 0.09615 .0.1608 -0.0188 0.0683 0.07752 1.13491 
HSBC HDG. 0:217 0.15389 -0.1914； 0.21693 ； 0.0991 0.19596 1.97751 
HUTCHISON WHAMP. 6,1803^ 0.08423 -0.1828 8.16181 2.06087 4.0702 1.97499 
HYSAN DEV. 0.1243 0.11783 0.0276 -0.0193 0.06259 0.07022 1.12192 
JOHNSON ELECTRIC HDG. -0.2621 0.57876 0.4361 0.19907 0.23796 0.36833 1.54786 
LEGEND HOLDINGS -2,5573; -0.9949 ^171.68 1.05221 -43.544 85.4345 -1.962 
LI & FUNG 0.2906' 0.21858 0.2946 0.26435 0.26702 0.03497 0.13097 
NEW WORLD DEV. 0.3742； 0.30162 -0.4799 -0.2011 ；-0.0013 0.40898 -312.16 
PACIFIC CEN.CYBERWORKS -0.2768 -0.8959 -32.251 -6.4273 -9.9627 15.1138 -1.517 
SHANGHAI INDUSTRIAL HDG. -0.276 2.93938 0.1374 -0.1342 0.66666 1.52482 2.28725 
SUN HUNG KAI PROPS. 0.0331； 0.34852 >0.3821 0.09303 0.02314 0.30279 13.0828 
SINO LAND -0.4655 0.40459 -0.4558 0.34394 -0.0432 0.48267 -11.179 
SMARTONE TELECOM 0.567 1.23303 0.1518 -0.4641 0.37194 0.71342 1.91807 
SWIRE PACIFIC ’A, -0,0182； -0.0975 :-0.7107 0.93472 0.02708 0.67963 25.0981 
TV.BROADCASTS -0.0348 0.25659 -0,2055 -0.0256 -0.0023 0.19142 -81.931 
WHARF HDG. -0.1935 0.09846 0.0695 -0.0785 -0.026 0.13592 -5.2278 
WHEELOCK & CO. | 0.0807 0.43347 -0.0948 -0.2936| 0.03144 0.30858 9.81574 
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Table 5 Dividend Payout Ratio of 33 Hang Seng Index Constituents from 1996 to 1999 
Company Name 96 97 98 99 I M SD SD/M 
AMOY PROPERTIES ^ 0 . 5 1 ^ ~ 0 . 5 2 - 0.51 0.86 ； 0.6 0.17 0.2890 
BANK OF EAST ASIA ¢.0,46¾ 0.46 “ 0,47;! 0.49 ,, 0.47 > 0.0141 0.0301 
CATHAY PACIFIC ^ 0.44 i 0.59，0.62 0.46 0.2175¾ 0.5623 2,5852 
CHEUNG KONG HDG. 0.23 0.21 0.44 0.05 0.2325! 0.1601 0.6885 
CHEUNG KONG INFR. - 0.21 j 0.28 ' 0.30 " 0.30 0.2725j 0.0427 6 , 1 5 6 8 
CHINA MOBILE (HK) LTD. N/A 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
CHINA RES.ENTREP. 1 0.22 0.19 0,19 0.19 0.1975 :; 0.015 0.0759 
CITIC PACIFIC ^ 0,19 < 0.20 ^0.53¾: 0.54 0.365 0.1964 0.5380 
CLP HOLDINGS LTD 0,59 i 0.48 0.72 0.72 0.6275 0.1159 0,1846 
DAO HENG BANK GP. 0.36 0.49 0,52 0.48 0.4625 0.0704 0:1522 
FIRST PACIFIC 0.31 0.24 0.04 0.10 0.1725 0.1242 0.7200 
HANG LUNG DEV. 0.401 0.40 0.40 0.80 0.5 s 0.2 0.4000 
HANG SENG BANK 0.70 0.70 0.96 0.94 . 0.825 j | 0.1446 0.1752 
HENDERSON INV. 0.62 0.66 0.56 0.40 0.56 0.1143 0 : 2 0 4 1 
HENDERSON LD.DEV. 0.44 0.53 : 0.48 0.46 0.4775 ； 0.0386 0.0809 
HK.& CHINA GAS 0.54 0.57 ^ 0.57 i 0.57 0.5625 ? 0.015 0.0267 
HONG KONG ELECTRIC 0.60 0.58 0.58 0.58 0.585 J 0.01 0.0171 
HSBC HDG. 0.35 0.40 0.57 0.52 0.46 i 0.1023 0.2224 
HUTCHISON WHAMP. 0.45 0.49 0,57 ； 0.05 Q.39 ) 0.2321 0.5951 
HYSAN DEV. ； 0.85 0.85 0.42 0.34 0.615 � 0.2733 0,4444 
JOHNSON ELECTRIC HDG. 0.24 0.26 0.39 0.39 0.32 0.0812 0.2539 
LEGEND HOLDINGS 0 0.16 0.31 0.63 0.275 ： 0.2684 0.9760 
LI & FUNG 0.72 : 0.73 0.79 ； 0.76 0.75 ； 0.0316 0.0422 
NEW WORLD DEV. 0.42 0.58 0.48 0.48 0.49 0.0663 0.1354 
PACIFIC CEN.CYBERWORKS 0.53 0 0 ¾! 0 0.1325 0.265 2.0000 
SHANGHAI INDUSTRIAL HDG. 0.18 0.23 0.24 0.29 0.235 0.0451 0.1919 
SINO LAND 0.40 0.44 0.22¾ 0.26 0.33 0.1065 0.3226 
SMARTONE TELECOM 0.19 0.31 0.37 - 0.27 0.15 0.2898 1.9322 
SUN HUNG KAI PROPS. 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.39 0.3975 0.005 0.0126 
SWIRE PACIFIC 'A' 0.37 0.42 0.74 0.38 0.4775 J 0.1763 0.3693 
TV.BROADCASTS 0.70 0.66。： 0.70 ； 0.68 0.685 | 0.0191 ？； 0.0280 
WHARF HDG. 1.09 0.95 0.93 0.56 0.8825 • 0.2265 0.2566 
WHEELOCK & CO. 0.35 0.39 0.25 0.21 0.3 0.0841 0.2802 
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Table 6 Regression Results for Raw Data 
Hypotheses Independent Test 1 Test 2 
Variables Coefficients T-Ratios Coefficients T-Ratios 
(Standard (Standard 
Errors) Errors) 
Anti- Total I n c o m e - 0 . 0 9 9 9 -4.3910* -0.1125 -5.9724* 
Signaling Growth (0.0227) (0.0188) 
Agency Cost Family -0.0004 -0.4459 -0.0006 -0.7164 
Shareholders (0.0009) (0.0009) 
Concentration 
Residual Free Cash .0.0021 3.0952* 0.0025 5.6791* 
Flow Growth (0.0007) (0.0004) 
Investment Fixed Assets -0.0531 -3.3816* -0.0563 -4.2692* 
Opportunities Growth (0.0157) (0.0132) 
Industries Technology -0.1933 -2.2069** -0.2468 -5.0714* 
(0.0876) (0.0487) 
Conglomerates~~-0.0014 -0.0138 N/A 
(0.0998) 
Manufacturing 0.1089 0.9788 
(0.1113) 
Finance 0.0799 0.9424 一 
(0.0848) 
Property 0.0714 0.8226 
(0.0869) 
Utilities 0.1496 1.4755 
(0.1014) 
Transportation 0.0159 0.1854 
(0.0860) 
Constants 0.3555 4.1584* 0.4117 9.5041* 
(0.0855) (0.0433) 
Dependent Variable Dividend Payout Ratio 
Number of Observations 16 
R-Square 0.3708 0.3362 
R-Bar-Square 0.2626 0.2888 
*, **, and *** indicate significance at the 1, 5，and 10 percent levels respectively 
using a two-tailed Student's t-test. 
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Table 7 Regression Results using Substantial Shareholders Concentration 
as Proxy for Agency Cost Hypothesis 
Hypotheses Independent Test 1 Test 2 
Variables Coefficients T-Ratios Coefficients T-Ratios 
(Standard (Standard 
Errors) Errors) 
Anti- Total I n c o m e - 0 . 0 9 3 2 -4.1200* -0.1025 -6.2235* 
Signaling Growth (0.0226) (0.0165) 
Agency Cost Substantial -0.0474 -0.8312 -0.0584 -1.1583 
Shareholders (0.0570) (0.0505) 
Concentration 
Residual Free Cash 0.0022 3.0366* 0.0024 4.0638* — 
Flow Growth (0.0007) (0.0006) 
Investment Fixed Assets -0.0530 -3.5672* -0.0553 -4.3468* “ 
Opportunities Growth (0.0149) (0.0127) 
Industries Technology -0.1909 -2.2541** -0.2449 -4.8705* — 
(0.0847) (0.0503) 
Conglomerates 0.0079 0.0788 N/A “ 
(0.0998) 
Manufacturing 0.1241 1.1191 
(0.1109) 
Finance 0.0847 1.0370 
(0.0817) 
Property 0.0706 0.8532 
(0.0828) 
Utilities 0.1109 0.9735 
(0.1139) 
Transportation 0.0187 0.2204 
(0.0848) 
Constants 0.3784 4.3067* 0.4403 9.8336* 
(0.0879) (0.0448) 
Dependent Variable Dividend Payout Ratio 
Number of Observations 76 
R-Square 0.3744 1 0.3424 
R-Bar-Square 0.2669 0.2954 
*, **, and *** indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels respectively 
using a two-tailed Student's t-test. 
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Table 8 Summary of Regression Results 
Hypothesis Variable Description Regression 
Results 
A n t i - S i g n a l i n g T I G t 々 d p ； S i g n i f i c a n t ^ 
A g e n c y C o s t p s c 个 啐 p p i I n s i g n i f i c a n t 
Substantial T . _ 
Shareholders SSCt O DPi Insignificant 
Concentration (SSC) 
Residual Free Cash Flow . 
GrowthRate(FCFG) F C F G t ^ D P t S l g n i f i c a n t 
Investment Fixed Assets Growth „ . � ^ ^ , .广 
Opportunities Rate (FAG) F A G t ^ D P i S—ficant 
Technology Technology Dummy 
Industry (TECH) TECH � D P ! Significant 
Phenomenon 
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Chart 1 Dividend Payout Ratios of 83 HK Listed Firms 
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Appendix 1 The Complete Dataset 
亡6 糊 COMPANY NAME D P v , TIG FSC 爹！FCFG FAG SSCTEC M F P U TR 
AMOY PROPERTIES 0.09374 0.025 4.48632 ,-0.08587 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
BANK OF EAST ASIA < 0 ^ 6 0.06128 , 6.8524； 0.0577¾; 0.00806 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
293.CATHAY PACIFIC ^0：44 -0.0358 0.00059 -0.1649 0.09913 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
f IJ CHEUNG KONG HDG. ；^0：23 0.46438 34.71 -0.1857 1.14554 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
941 CHINA MOBILE (HK) LTD. ^ ^ 0.14977, 2.9E^05 4.15417 ；, 0.61378 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
291 CHINA RES.ENTREP. 0.22} 1.10511 0.0357 0.345391 0.53917 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
267 CITIC PACIFIC 0.19 0.35395 17:99 2.8002210.06367- 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
l O l i CHEUNG KONG INFR. ^ 0.21 0.00486 ^84.82 -0.2542 .0.13852 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2 CLP HOLDINGS LTD - 0-591 0.08956 , 2 7 J 9 2.21159- 0.04265 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 ：6 
2 _ D A O HENG BANK GP. 036 0.06195 'fi 71,57^ 0.01235 ' 0.11007, 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
l | | F I R S T PACIFIC . 0:31； - 0 . 3 4 7 1 2 3 . 0 8 0.14738 5,0.30985 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
10 HANG LUNG DEV. 0.4 -0.1849 25.52 0.11147-0.03901, 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 :0 
1¾ HANG SENG BANK 0.7 0.04033 0.182 0.00788 -0.13536 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
97 HENDERSON INV. 0.62 -0.263 65.71 30.212 -0.05893 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
12 HENDERSON LD.DEV. 0.44 0.05844 65.02 0.23047 0.05255 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
；3iHK.& CHINA GAS 0.54 0.07083 ^31.34 -0.021^0.02135 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
6 HONG KONG ELECTRIC 0.6 0.08336 37.63 132.361 0.07201 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
5 HSBC HDG. 0.35 0.12378 . 0.03 0.34316 0.07454 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
13 HUTCHISON WHAMP. 0.45 0.14919 45.63 0.91833 0.10132 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
14 HYSAN DEV. 0.85 0.35006 0.458 -0.2691 -0.37647 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
179 JOHNSON ELECTRIC HDG. . 0.24 0.09177 59.43 0.22511 -0.05403 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
992 LEGEND HOLDINGS f ， 0 0.6056 0.1986 1.22864 0.25278 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
494 LI&FUNG o M 0.09254 51.31 0.13593 0.09401 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
17 NEW WORLD DEV. 0.42； 0.02512 0.16 -0.0672 ^ 0.00535 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
8 PACIFIC CEN.CYBERWORKS 0.53 -0.1914 27.5 171.559 H 2.18927 I i 0 0 0 0 0 0 
363 SHANGHAI INDUSTRIAL HDG. 0.18 0.54262 0.1128 0.48839 0.1107 1 0 1: 0 0 0 0 0 
16 SUN HUNG KAI PROPS. 0.4 0.03398 46.42 0.13079 ： 0.01164 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
83 SINO LAND 0.4 0.18856 0.066 0.51013;-0.07129 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
315 SMARTONE TELECOM 0.19 0.34323 0.59 1.13907 0.2091 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
19 SWIRE PACIFIC'A' 0.37 -0.2246 0,1452 0.1047 -0.10506 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
511 TV.BROADCASTS 0.7 0.03845 32.74 0.70447 0.06285 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
4 WHARF HDG. 1.09 0.08035 0.029 1.4283 -0.08636 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
20 WHEELOCK&CO. 0.35 0.56853 0.4249 1.03047； 3.22859 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
373 ALLIED GROUP 0 0.4771 24.3216 0.33964 6.38574 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
679 ASIA TELE-NET & TECH. 0.09 0.14924 0.24997 0.85111 0.17326 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
52¾ ASM PACIFIC TECH. 0.49 0.13693 49.8757 0.22337 0.00699 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
3||；BEIJING YANHUA 'H' 0.58 0.03826 0 1.25379 0.23673 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
^355^ CENTURY CITY 0.19 -0.0181 62.5797 -0.2158 -0.18777 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
� 6 7 0 CHINA EASTERN AIRL. 'H' 0 3.67296 5.8E-05 0.10745; 0.08608 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
^ .257 CHINA EVERBRIGHT INTL. 0 0.88003 0 -0.5487 0,31572 1 Q 1 0 0 0 0 0 
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Continued - Appendix 1 — 
CO 画 COMPANY NAME ffpflTIG .FSCjpFCFG FSG :¾) SSCTE C H F P U TR 
235； CHINA INTERNET GLOBAL F 0.05 0.00377 ； ；; 40.38 0.51233 -0.12298 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1093； CHINA PHARMACEUTICAL 0.43； 0.66344 ^^2.27? 3.07486 ； 0.60858 1 0 0 | | 0 0 0 0 
105| CHINA STHN.AIRL 'H' : ¾ ¾ 3 . 2 3 4 7 7 ^ ^ ^ 0 0.38212 鬆 0.14755 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
326 CHINA STAR ENTERTAINMENT 0.53899 :^17^67 0.867730.32558 1 � 0 OkO O i O 0 0 
1137 CITY TELECOM 0.29122 J^50 .55 2.73315^0.86283 0 1 0 0 0 0 Of 0 
203 DENWAY MOTORS LTD. f ^ i o ! -0.0331:0.147¾ -0.0583 -0.10821 1^ 0 0 1 0 0 0; 0 
113 DICKSON CONCEPTS % 0.19 0.09751 52.386 0.64835 0.10912 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
524 E-KONG GROUP LTD. J r h 0 -0.3316 ,:,7.0517 8.72563 0,02909 0 . 1 0 0 0 , 0 0 0 
571 ESUNHDG. LTD. !/.0.3¾ 0.631590.6058 0.53513；： 1.28049 0 0 0 0 0 0 0::::0 
717 FPB BANK 鸯 0.31 -0.0752¾ 0.7536 -0.12771-0.03289； 1 ; 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
525； GUANGSHEN RAILWAY 'H' %} 0.36 -0.0664 -0.08681 0.03615 1 ；0 0 0 0 0 0 f l 
155 HINET HOLDINGS LTD. f 0.44 -0.2926 又;义0.£ 0.83742 ；-0.35849 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
535 HING KONG HOLDINGS 二“ 0 -0.5812^ 6.5554 0.80484 f-5.54705 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
190 HONG KONG CONSTRUCTION " 0.46 0.01295 f 6.2201 -0.1123^-0.33587 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
715 ICG ASIAWORKS LTD. 0.43 -0.108/ ::37.79 0.00627^ 0.05752 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
167 IDT INTL. 0.17 0.22157 59.215 1.36469 f 0.08455 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
636 INTL.BANK OF ASIA 潘0.38 -0.0064 ^ ^ S p O 0.09915¾ 0.04943 1 ; 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
626 JCG HOLDINGS 0：46： -0.3491 ； 55.385 0.52205 >0.09583 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
488 LAI SUN DEV. 0.27 0.01641 ' � 5 0 . 6 6 0.3685 f 0.07295 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
156 LIPPO CHINA RES. 0.18 0.01535 27；183 0.05691^ 6.11235 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1111 LIU CHONG HING BANK ().45 0.00193 : 56.1 0.26526 J -0.11977 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
323 MAANSHAN IRON & STL.'H’ 0.77 -0.0025 4.5E-05 -0.1731 0,03469 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
478 MINGLY 0.13 0.22392 66.38 0.02286 0.01767 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
389 MOULIN INTL. 0.44 0.30241 40.566 3.16549 0.2393 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
1182 ORIENTAL UNION HDG. 0.37 -0.2594 41.212 0.1563 -0.05143 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
78 REGAL HOTELS INTL.HDG. 0.43 -0.0194 74.25 -0.0946 -0.17043 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
501 RNA HOLDINGS 0.5 0.02283 0.2435 2.62884 \ 0.65758 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
577 SKYNET (INTL GP) HDG. , 0.13 -0.0301 0,2394 -0.2444 0.45337 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1166 SOLARTECH INTL.HDG. 0.22 0.23044 61.417 4.92659 0.52946 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
28 TIAN AN CHINA INVS. 0.33 0.17499 " 0 0.5406 0.13559 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
322 TINGYI CYMN.ISLE.HDG. 0.19 0.08723 33.4 -0.0374 0.08097 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
268 TOP GLORY INTERNATIONAL 0.29 0.14205 50.5 0.40499 0.15719 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
757 VANDA SYSTEMS 0.28 0.39366 50.433 0.0472 0.38851 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
96 WING LUNG BK. 0.39 0.05552 7.6414 0.20854 -0.0914 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
1171 YANZHOU COAL MINING 'H' 0 0.01456 3.8E-05 1.38262 0.48411 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
613 YUGANG INTERNATIONAL 0.3 -0.3871 15.839 0.20967 0.60563 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
DP : Dividend Payout Ratio TE : Technology 
TIG : Total Income Growth C : Conglomerates 
FSC : Family Shareholders Concentration M: Manufacturing 
FCFG : Free Cash Flow Growth F : Finance 
FAG : Fixed Assets Growth P ： Property 
SSC : Substantial Shareholders Concentration U : Utilities 
TR : Transportation 
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Appendix 2 Definition of Variables in Different Sectors 
VariableVSector Banks Finance Security Industrials Property 
House Companies 
Dividends per Dividend per share for the financial period is adjusted for subsequent rights and scrip 
Share issues. Bonus or special dividends are excluded. 
Earnings per Net profit after tax, minority interest, pre-acquisition profits and preference dividends 
Share attributable to ordinary shareholders but before extraordinary items divided by the 
average number of shares in issue during the period. It is adjusted for subsequent rights 
and scrip issues. 
The net profit is also before N/A 
any transfers to inner reserves. 
Total Income 'Turnover or total revenue' as reported on profit and loss account. 
It is the operating income for This includes For diversified groups it can also 
the year, which comprises 'net income from include gross premium in respect of 
interest income' plus 'other brokerage, insurance activities, rental income 
operating income' (such as net profits on share and billings on sale from 
fees and commissions, trading, properties, revenue derived from 
dividend income, profits from underwriting investment activities, lease rentals, 
dealing in foreign currencies commission, interest income from hire purchase 
and securities, rental income share and loan financing, 




Total Cash & Reported figure for Sum of cash, deposits and This includes but is not limited to 
Equivalent cash and short term short-term loans and cash and bank balances, fixed term 
funds, which investments shown within and bank deposits (not deposits 
includes cash and current assets. shown as part of other debtors), 
balances with other short term investments/trading 
banks, money at securities, cash balances with a 
call and at short financial company, loans to 
notice, treasury associates, current portion of long 
bills, term deposits term loans if forming part of 
maturing under 1 current assets, cash assets of 
month, placements subsidiaries engaged in financial 
with banks activities, managed funds shown in 
maturing between current assets. 
1 and 12 months 
are not included. 
Total Net Fixed N/A Total tangible fixed Net tangible 
Assets assets, i.e. the total fixed assets 
amount of property, as shown 
plant and equipment by company 
used in business net on balance 
of accumulated sheets. It 
depreciation and includes 
amortization. The investment 
amount of capital property if 
work in progress is shown by 
included. Other companies 
long-term assets, as part of 
such as investments their 
in securities, tangible 
goodwill and other fixed assets, 
intangible assets, are 
not included. 
Source: Datastream International database 
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Appendix 3 Non-Nested Tests 
Various non-nested tests such as N-test，J-test, JA-test, encompassing test，Cox 
test and Davidson and MacKinnon test have been performed to find out the ranking of 
the hypotheses. From the results shown in Table A3.1，we can conclude that the anti-
signaling hypothesis ranks first; investment opportunities hypothesis ranks second; 
residual hypothesis ranks third; and agency cost hypothesis ranks last. Note that both 
of the family shareholders concentration and the substantial shareholders 
concentration variables of the agency cost hypothesis give the same ranking when 
they are tested against the rest of the hypotheses. In other words, the anti-signaling 
hypothesis is the best to explain companies' dividend payout ratios in Hong Kong. 
Investment opportunities hypothesis is the second best，residual hypothesis is the third 
and agency cost hypothesis is the worst one. Tables A3.2 to A3.10 give the detailed 
results of all the non-nested tests. 
In addition, when the technology dummy variable is put to test against each of 
the four hypothesis, the technology variable ranks first, which is even better than the 
anti-signaling hypothesis to explain the dividend policy in Hong Kong This result can 
be viewed from Table A3.11. 
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Table A3.1 Non-nested Tests Results 
Hypothesis A Anti-signaling Agency Cost Residual n nvestment 
vs Hypothesis Hypothesis Hypothesis ^ , . 
Hypothesis B (TIG) (FCS/SSC) (FCFG) 
Favors Favors Favors 
Anti-signaling Anti- Anti- Anti-
Hypothesis signaling signaling signaling 
(TIG) (Table A3.2/ (Table A3.3) (Table A3.4) 
A3.8) 
Favors Favors Favors 
Agency Cost Anti- Residual Investment 
Hypothesis Signaling (Table A3.5/ Opportunities 
(FCS/SSC) (Table A3.2/ A3.9) (Table A3.6/ 
A3.8) A3.10) 
n . , , Favors Favors Favors Residual •丄. n . � . T t t th . Anti- Residual Investment 
茫 Signaling (Table A3.5/ Opportunities 
1 � (Table A3.3) A19) (Table A3.7) 
T ‘ 4 Favors Favors Favors Investment . . 丫 q . -t. Anti- Investment Investment 
Hvnnthe i^ ^  Signaling Opportunities Opportunities 
^ A r n (Table A3.4) (Table A3.6/ (Table A3.7) 
( 衡 ） A3.10) 
Ranking: 
First: Anti-signaling Hypothesis 
Second: Investment Opportunities Hypothesis 
Third: Residual Hypothesis 
Fourth: Agency Cost Hypothesis 
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Table A3.2 Non-Nested Test Statistics and Choice Criteria 
Anti-signaling Hypothesis (TIG) vs Agency Cost Hypothesis (FSC) 
* * * * * * ^^ * * * * * ^^ * * * * * * * ^^ * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
Dependent variable is DP 76 observations used from 1 to 76 
Regressors for model Ml: 
C TIG (Anti-signaling Hypothesis) 
Regressors for model M2: 
C FSC (Agency Cost Hypothesis) 
出企出企企企企企企出虫士出出企虫论出企企出出出出出 s t f s l c s k论众企企企企企士企企企企企企企企企企士企企企少士企企企士企小小山小小小山小 个个个个个个个个个个个个个个个个个个个个个个个个个个个个个个个个个个个个个个个个个个个个个个个个个个个个个个个个个个个不不不不不不不不不 
Test Statistic Ml against M2 M2 against Ml 
N-Test .22323[.823] -52.1242[.000] 
NT-Test .65483[.513] -4.2288[.000] 
W-Test .65978[.509] -4.0610[.000] 
J-Test -.28493 [.776] 2：6869[.007] 
JA-Test -.28493 [.776] 2.6869[.007] 
Encompassing F (1, 73) .081187[.777] F (1，73) 7.2196[.009] 
S-Test 100 replications .11228[.911] -11.9178[.000] 
PE-Test -.28493[.776] 2.6869[.007] “ 
BM-Test -.28493 [.776] 2.6869[.007] 
DL-Test .33336[.739] 2.6801[.007] 
Sargan's Likelihood Criterion for Ml versus M2= 3.5415 favors Ml 
Vuong's Likelihood Criterion for Ml versus M2= 16.0306[.000] favors Ml 
Akaike 丨 s Information Criterion of Ml versus M2= 3.5415 favors M1 
Schwarz's Bayesian Criterion of Ml versus M2= 3.5415 favors Ml 
Note: 
S-Test: SC c test proposed by Pesaran and Pesaran (1995) and is the simple 
version of the simulated Cox test statistic. 
PE-Test: MacKinnon, White and Davidson Test. 
BM-Test: Bera and McAleer Test. 
DL-Test: the double-length regression test statistic due to Davidson and MacKinnon. 
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Table A3.3 Non-Nested Test Statistics and Choice Criteria 
Anti-signaling Hypothesis (TIG) vs Residual Hypothesis (FCFG) 
Dependent variable is DP 76 observations used from 1 to 76 
Regressors for model Ml: 
C TIG (Anti-signaling Hypothesis) 
Regressors for model M2: 
C FCFG (Residual Hypothesis) 
* )Jc * * * * * * * * * C^ * * * * ^^  * ^^  * * * ^^  ^^  * * * * * * * * * * * * * J^^  * * * * * ^^  * * * * * * * * * * * * 
Test Statistic Ml against M2 M2 against Ml 
N-Test -5.5417[.000] -27.5794[.000] 
NT-Test -1.0246[.306] -4.2820[.000] 
W-Test -1.0150[.310] -4.1128[.000] 
J-Test 1.3771[.168] 2.5964[.009] 
JA-Test 1.3771[.168] 2.5964[.009] 
Encompassing F (1, 73) 1.8964[.173 F (1, 73) 6.7413[.011] 
S-Test 100 replications -.56887[.569] -4.0812[.000] 
PE-Test 1.3771[.168] 2.5964[.009] 
BM-Test 1.3771[.168] 2.5964[.009] 
DL-Test 1.4053[.160] 2.5942[.009] 
Sargan's Likelihood Criterion for Ml versus M2= 2.3819 favors Ml 
Vuong's Likelihood Criterion for Ml versus M2= 10.2705[.000] favors Ml 
Akaike1 s Information Criterion of Ml versus M2= 2.3819 favors Ml 
Schwarz 丨 s Bayesian Criterion of Ml versus M2= 2.3819 favors Ml 
* * * * * * 氺 * * * * * 本 氺 氺 氺 * * 氺 * 本 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 本 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 
Note: 
S-Test: SC c test proposed by Pesaran and Pesaran (1995) and is the simple 
version of the simulated Cox test statistic. 
PE-Test: MacKinnon, White and Davidson Test. 
BM-Test: Bera and McAleer Test. 
DL-Test: the double-length regression test statistic due to Davidson and MacKinnon. 
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Table A3.4 Non-Nested Test Statistics and Choice Criteria 
Anti-signaling Hypothesis (TIG) vs Investment Opportunities 
Hypothesis (FAG) 
Dependent variable is DP 76 observations used from 1 to 76 
Regressors for model Ml: 
C TIG (Anti-signaling Hypothesis) 
Regressors for model M2: 
C FAG (Investment Opportunities Hypothesis) 
士 企 士 企 企企 + 企 • 士 U^ • 士 • 士 U^ ^ L^* • ^  • 山小 «1« «1« 小 vL* «1« 山 xL* vL» 个Tv 个个 I s 个个 » p个个个个个个个 * p 个1> 个个个个个个个个个个个个个个个个个个个个个个个个个个个个个个个个个不 J^s VJ^个个不 
Test Statistic Ml against M2 M2 against Ml 
N-Test -101.5455[.000] -129.7632[.000] 
NT-Test -3.8442[.000] -4.6126[.000] 
W-Test -3.7177[.000] -4.4286[.000] 
J-Test 2.6271[.009] 2.8454[.004] 
JA-Test -2.6271[.009] -2.8454[.004] 
Encompassing F (1, 73) 6.9016[.010] F (1，73) 8.0962[.006] 
S-Test 100 replications -1.5234[.128] -1.8276[.068] 
PE-Test 2.6271[.009] 2.8454[.004] 
BM-Test -2.6271 [.009] -2.8454[.004] 
DL-Test 2.6234[.009] 2.8294[.005] 
Sargan丨s Likelihood Criterion for Ml versus M2= .56395 favors Ml 
Vuong's Likelihood Criterion for Ml versus M2= 1.6705[.095] favors Ml 
Akaike 丨 s Information Criterion of Ml versus M2= .56395 favors Ml 
Schwarz 丨 s Bayesian Criterion of Ml versus M2= .56395 favors Ml 
氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 * 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 
Note: 
S-Test: SC c test proposed by Pesaran and Pesaran (1995) and is the simple 
version of the simulated Cox test statistic. 
PE-Test: MacKinnon, White and Davidson Test. 
BM-Test: Bera and McAleer Test. 
DL-Test: the double-length regression test statistic due to Davidson and MacKinnon. 
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Table A3.5 Non-Nested Test Statistics and Choice Criteria 
Residual Hypothesis (FCFG) vs Agency Cost Hypothesis (FSC) 
Dependent variable is DP 76 observations used from 1 to 76 
Regressors for model Ml: 
C FCFG (Residual Hypothesis) 
Regressors for model M2: 
C FSC (Agency Cost Hypothesis) 
Test Statistic Ml against M2 M2 against Ml 
N-Test -.42073 [.674] -55.4107[.000] 
NT-Test .63412[.526] -.95189[.341] 
W-Test .63793[.524] -.94324[.346] 
J-Test 20856[.835] 1.5188[.129] 
JA-Test .20856[.835] 1.5188[.129] 
Encompassing F (1, 73) .043496[,835] F (1, 73) 2.3068[.133] 
S-Test 100 replications -.11750[.906] -4.0406[.000] 
PE-Test .20856[.835] 1.5188[.129] 
BM-Test .20856[.835] 1.5188[.129] 
DL-Test .26820[.789] 1.5460[.122] 
Sargan丨s Likelihood Criterion for Ml versus M2= 1.1596 favors Ml 
Vuong's Likelihood Criterion for Ml versus M2= 12.2788[.000] favors Ml 
Akaike's Information Criterion of Ml versus M2= 1.1596 favors Ml 
Schwarz's Bayesian Criterion of Ml versus M2= 1.1596 favors Ml 
氺 氺 * 氺 氺 氺 氺 * 氺 氺 * 氺 氺 氺 * 氺 本 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 . 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 
Note: 
S-Test: SC c test proposed by Pesaran and Pesaran (1995) and is the simple 
version of the simulated Cox test statistic. 
PE-Test: MacKinnon, White and Davidson Test. 
BM-Test: Bera and McAleer Test. 
DL-Test: the double-length regression test statistic due to Davidson and MacKinnon. 
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Table A3.6 Non-Nested Test Statistics and Choice Criteria 
Agency Cost Hypothesis (FSC) vs Investment Opportunities 
Hypothesis (FAG) 
士 士 + • 企 企 士 企 + 士 士 ^ t 士 士 士 士 士企企士企士企士 ^ • 士 士 • ^ 企 山 必 • + + 由 山 必 小 山 山 必 山 山 小 « ! > %L* 山 山 山 山 山 个 I s 个 个 个 个 个 个 个 个 个 个 个 个 个 个 个 个 个 个 个 个 ^ ^ 个 个 个 个 个 个 个 个 个 个 个 个 个 个 个 个 个 个 平 个 个 不 个 个 个 个 个 
Dependent variable is DP 76 observations used from 1 to 76 
Regressors for model Ml: 
C FSC (Agency Cost Hypothesis) 
Regressors for model M2: 
C FAG (Investment Opportunities Hypothesis) 
少出企论众众企论论虫众虫众skslc虫虫论出企企企虫企^!(企论少士士众士少企众企企企企士士士士企企企士企士企士士企企企企士士士必必<1*小>1*小小*1*«1» 个个个个个个个个个个个个个个个个个个个个个个个个个个个个个个个个个个个个个个个个个个个个个个个个个个个个不平平不不不不不不不不不不不不不 
Test Statistic Ml against M2 M2 against Ml 
N-Test -106.0752[.000] �12354[.902] 
NT-Test -3.4415[.001] .63188[.527] 
W-Test -3.3301[.001] .63561[.525] 
J-Test 2.4415[.015] .099137[.921] 
JA-Test 2.4415[.015] .099137[.921] 
Encompassing F (1，73) 5.9607[.017] F (1，73) .0098282f.921] 
S-Test 100 replications -8.6743[.000] .27561[.783] 
PE-Test 2.4415 [.015] .099137[.921] 
BM-Test 2.4415[.015] .099137[.921] 
DL-Test 2.4464[.014] .19208[.848] 
Sargan1S Likelihood Criterion for Ml versus M2= -2.9775 favors M2 
Vuong's Likelihood Criterion for Ml versus M2= -15.0810[.000] favors M2 
Akaike's Information Criterion of Ml versus M2= -2.9775 favors M2 
Schwarz's Bayesian Criterion of Ml versus M2= -2.9775 favors M2 
Note: 
S-Test: SC c test proposed by Pesaran and Pesaran (1995) and is the simple 
version of the simulated Cox test statistic. 
PE-Test: MacKinnon, White and Davidson Test. 
BM-Test: Bera and McAleer Test. 
DL-Test: the double-length regression test statistic due to Davidson and MacKinnon. 
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Table A3.7 Non-Nested Test Statistics and Choice Criteria 
Residual Hypothesis (FCFG) vs Investment Opportunities 
Hypothesis (FAG) 
Dependent variable is DP 76 observations used from 1 to 76 
Regressors for model Ml: 
C FCFG (Residual Hypothesis) 
Regressors for model M2: 
C FAG (Investment Opportunities Hypothesis) 
Test Statistic Ml against M2 M2 against Ml 
N-Test -19.5753[.000] -5.0131[.000] 
NT-Test -3.4722[.001] -.98581[.324] 
W-Test -3.3596[.001] -.97670[.329] 
J-Test 2.6974[.007] 1.8778[.060] 
JA-Test -2.6974[.007] -1.8778[.060] 
Encompassing F (1, 73) 7.2762[.009] F (1，73) 3.5261 [.064] 
S-Test 100 replications -3.2521[.001] -’42343[.672] 
PE-Test 2.6974[.007] 1.8778[.060] 
BM-Test -2.6974[.007] -1 • 8778 [. 060] 
DL-Test 2.6901[.007] 1.8998[.057] 
Sargan1 s Likelihood Criterion for Ml versus M2= -1.8180 favors M2 
Vuong's Likelihood Criterion for Ml versus M2= -7.9887[.000] favors M2 
Akaike1 s Information Criterion of Ml versus M2= -1.8180 favors M2 
Schwarz's Bayesian Criterion of Ml versus M2= -1.8180 favors M2 
氺 * * 氺 * * * * * * * 氺 氺 * * * 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 * 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 木 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 
Note: 
S-Test: SC c test proposed by Pesaran and Pesaran (1995) and is the simple 
version of the simulated Cox test statistic. 
PE-Test: MacKinnon, White and Davidson Test. 
BM-Test: Bera and McAleer Test. 
DL-Test: the double-length regression test statistic due to Davidson and MacKinnon. 
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Table A3.8 Non-Nested Test Statistics and Choice Criteria 
Agency Cost Hypothesis (SSC) vs Anti-signaling Hypothesis (TIG) 
^ •企企 士 + 企 士 + 企• ^^ 士 • 士 ^^ ^  • 士 • • • 士 企• ^  ^ ^ ^ 少山 ^  山 小 小山 L^* 山 山 山山山山 山 «1« 山山 个个 I s 个 个 个 个 个 个 个 » 1 * 个个个个个个个个个个个个个个个个个个个 ^ ^个个个个个个个个个个个个个个个个个个 
Dependent variable is DP 76 observations used from 1 to 76 
Regressors for model Ml: 
C SSC (Agency Cost Hypothesis) 
Regressors for model M2: 
C TIG (Anti-signaling Hypothesis) 
氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 * 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 水 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 
Test Statistic Ml against M2 M2 against Ml 
N-Test -20.2915[.000] -3.7902[.000] 
NT-Test -4.2103[.000] -.89501[.371] 
W-Test -4.0441[.000] -88735[.375] 
J-Test 2.5500[.011] 1.2601[.208] 
JA-Test 2.5500[.011] 1.2601[.208] 
Encompassing F (1，73) 6.5027[.013] F (1，73) 1.5879[.212] 
S-Test 100 replications -2.5991 [.009] - 51714[.605] 
PE-Test 2.5500[.011] 1.2601 [.208] 
BM-Test 2.5500[.011] 1.2601 [.208] 
DL-Test 2.5501[.011] 1.2890[.197] 
Sargan's Likelihood Criterion for Ml versus M2= -2.4249 favors M2 
Vuong's Likelihood Criterion for Ml versus M2= -8.7326[.000] favors M2 
Akaike1S Information Criterion of Ml versus -2.4249 favors M2 
Schwarz's Bayesian Criterion of Ml versus M2= -2.4249 favors M2 
氺 * 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 * 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 本 水 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 . 氺 . 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 
Note: 
S-Test: SC c test proposed by Pesaran and Pesaran (1995) and is the simple 
version of the simulated Cox test statistic. 
PE-Test: MacKinnon, White and Davidson Test. 
BM-Test: Bera and McAleer Test. 
DL-Test: the double-length regression test statistic due to Davidson and MacKinnon. 
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Table A3.9 Non-Nested Test Statistics and Choice Criteria 
Agency Cost Hypothesis (SSC) vs Residual Hypothesis (FCFG) 
氺 * 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 * 氺 * 氺 氺 氺 * * * * * 氺 氺 * * 氺 * * * * 氺 * * * 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 * * * 氺 * * 氺 氺 * * 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 * 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 
Dependent variable is DP 76 observations used from 1 to 76 
Regressors for model Ml: 
C SSC (Agency Cost Hypothesis) 
Regressors for model M2: 
C FCFG (Residual Hypothesis) 
山山山山 %(« 必山 ^  小必 ^  少 企 士 •必 士 •少 ^ • 士 士 企 ^  ^ • 士 •企 • 士 企 + 士 士 士 ^  士 士 士 士 企企 士 企企 士 士 企 不不不不不个平个个个个个个个个个个个 ^ ^ ^ ^ 个 个 ^ ^ 个 个 个 个 个 个 个 个 个 ^ ^ 个 个 个 个 个 个 个 个 个 个 个 个 个 个 个 个 个 个 
Test Statistic Ml against M2 M2 against Ml 
N-Test -37.8866[.000] -35.9158[.000] 
NT-Test -.99767[.318] -.93896[.348] 
W-Test -.98844[.323] -.93078[.352] 
J-Test 1.5954[.lll] 1.5684[.117] 
JA-Test -1.5954[.lll] -1.5684[.l 17] 
Encompassing F (1, 73) 2.5451[.115] F (1，73) 2.4598[.121] 
S-Test 100 replications -.90582[.365] -1.3801[.168] 
PE-Test 1.5954[.lll] 1.5684[.117] 
BM-Test -1.5954[. I l l ] -1.5684[. 117] 
DL-Test 1.6217[.105] 1.5950[.lll] 
Sargan's Likelihood Criterion for Ml versus M2= -.042949 favors M2 
Vuong's Likelihood Criterion for Ml versus M2= -.21728[.828] favors M2 
Akaike1 s Information Criterion of Ml versus M2= -.042949 favors M2 
Schwarz1 s Bayesian Criterion of Ml versus M2= -.042949 favors M2 
企少士企企企企士企企企企企企士 士企企•企企士企•企 + + 士士 +士少士必士 + ^ +山山山*)!^*^^*小小小《1•必必山小山山*!**!**!*^*山山山山山山山山山山 个个个个个个个个 y I *个个个个个个个个个个个个个个个个个个个个个个个个个个个平个个个个个平个个个不平平不不不不不不不不不不不不不不不不不不 
Note: 
S-Test: SC c test proposed by Pesaran and Pesaran (1995) and is the simple 
version of the simulated Cox test statistic. 
PE-Test: MacKinnon, White and Davidson Test. 
BM-Test: Bera and McAleer Test. 
DL-Test: the double-length regression test statistic due to Davidson and MacKinnon. 
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Table A3.10 Non-Nested Test Statistics and Choice Criteria 
Agency Cost Hypothesis (SSC) vs Investment Opportunities 
Hypothesis (FAG) 
出出出出）k企 s k s l c s k出论汝出论企企企出众企出企出企企出论众企论士众企士众企企企企企企企企士企企企企企企企企企企士士山士小必山山小必山必小山 个个个个个个个卞个个个个个个个个个个个个个个个个个个个个个个个个个个个个个个个个个个个个个个个个个个个个予不不不不不不不不不不不不不不 
Dependent variable is DP 76 observations used from 1 to 76 
Regressors for model Ml: 
C SSC (Agency Cost Hypothesis) 
Regressors for model M2: 
C FAG (Investment Opportunities Hypothesis) 
* * 氺 * * 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 * 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 
Test Statistic Ml against M2 M2 against Ml 
N-Test -24.3914[.000] -5.9608[.000] 
NT-Test -3.5011[.000] -.95617[.339] 
W-Test . -3.3875[.001] ^.94776[.343] 
J-Test 2.3695[.018] 1.3629[.173] 
JA-Test 2.3695[.018] 1.3629[.173] 
Encompassing F (1, 73) 5.6146[.020] F (1, 73) 1.8575[.177] 
S-Test 100 replications -2.1731 [.030] -.37317[.709] 
PE-Test 2.3695[.018] 1.3629[.173] 
BM-Test 2.3695[.018] 1.3629[.173] 
DL-Test 2.3773[.017] 1.3912[.164] 
Sargan's Likelihood Criterion for Ml versus M2= -1.8609 favors M2 
Vuong's Likelihood Criterion for Ml versus M2= -7.1522[.000] favors M2 
Akaike's Information Criterion of Ml versus M2= -1.8609 favors M2 
Schwarz's Bayesian Criterion of Ml versus M2= -1.8609 favors M2 
氺 * * 氺 * 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 * 氺 * 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 本 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 
Note: 
S-Test: SC c test proposed by Pesaran and Pesaran (1995) and is the simple 
version of the simulated Cox test statistic. 
PE-Test: MacKinnon, White and Davidson Test. 
BM-Test: Bera and McAleer Test. 
DL-Test: the double-length regression test statistic due to Davidson and MacKinnon. 
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Table A3.11 Non-Nested Test Statistics and Choice Criteria 
Technology Industry Phenomenon (TECH) vs Anti-signaling 
Hypothesis (TIG) 
Dependent variable is DP 76 observations used from 1 to 76 
Regressors for model Ml: 
C TECH (Technology Industry Phenomenon) 
Regressors for model M2: 
C TIG (Anti-signaling Hypothesis) 
Test Statistic Ml against M2 M2 against Ml 
N-Test -97.2364[.000] -107.2314[.000] 
NT-Test -4.7257[. 000] -5.0725 [. 000] 
W-Test -4.5367[.000] -4.8537[.000] 
J-Test 2.8920[.004] 2.9851[.003] 
JA-Test -2.8920[.004] -2.9851 [.003] 
Encompassing F (1, 73) 8.3635[.005] F (1,73) 8.9109[.004] 
S-Test 100 replications -1.4065[.160] -1.9223[.055] 
PE-Test 2.8920[.004] 2.9851 [.003] 
BM-Test -2.8920[.004] -2.9851 [.003] 
DL-Test 2.8731 [.004] 2.9600[.003] 
Sargan1 s Likelihood Criterion for Ml versus M2= .25481 favors Ml 
Vuong's Likelihood Criterion for Ml versus M2= .67095[.502] favors Ml 
Akaike's Information Criterion of Ml versus M2= .25481 favors Ml 
Schwarz's Bayesian Criterion of Ml versus M2= .25481 favors Ml 
* 氺 * * * 氺 氺 * * * * 氺 * * * * * * * * 氺 氺 * 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 * 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 本 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 木 氺 氺 氺 木 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 氺 
Note: 
S-Test: SC c test proposed by Pesaran and Pesaran (1995) and is the simple 
version of the simulated Cox test statistic. 
PE-Test: MacKinnon, White and Davidson Test. 
BM-Test: Bera and McAleer Test. 
DL-Test: the double-length regression test statistic due to Davidson and MacKinnon. 
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